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RELEVANT STATUTES AND ORDINANCES, 
Section 10-7-26(2) of the Utah Code states, in part: 
Nothing contained in this section or in the sections referred to in Subsection 
(1) shall be construed to exempt any railway company from keeping every 
portion of every street and alley used by it and upon or across which tracks 
shall be constructed at or near the grade of such streets in good an safe 
condition for public travel, but it shall keep the same planked, paved, 
macadamized or otherwise in such condition for public travel as the 
governing body of the city or town may from time to time direct, keeping the 
plank, pavement or other surface of the street or alley level with the top of 
the rails of the track. 
"Railway company/5 for purposes of this section, is defined as "any company 
which owns or operates railway tracks on, along or across a street or alley in any 
city or town." Utah Code Ann. § 10-7-26(1). 
Section 10-7-29 of the Utah Code states, in part: 
The tracks of all railway companies when located upon the streets or 
avenues of a city or town shall be kept in repair and safe in all respects for 
the use of the traveling public, and such companies shall be liable for all 
damages resulting by reason of neglect to keep such tracks in repair . . . . For 
injuries to persons or property arising from the failure of any such company 
to keep its tracks in proper repair . . . such company shall be liable and the 
city or town shall be exempt from liability. 
"Railway company," for purposes of this section, is defined as "any persons, companies, 
corporations or associations owning or operating any street or other railway in any city or 
town." Utah Code Ann. § 10-7-29. 
Section 56-1 -11 of the Utah Code states: 
Every railroad company shall be liable for damages caused by neglect to 
make and maintain good and sufficient crossings at points where any line of 
travel crosses its road. 
1 
Salt Lake City Code section 14.44.030 requires "railway companies" to keep portions of 
streets "across which their tracks . . . are constructed and maintained in good and safe 
condition for public travel." 
Complete copies of each of the foregoing are included in the Addendum as Exhibit 
A. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Salt Lake City Southern Railroad Company, Inc. ( "SLCS") appeals from a final 
order entered by the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
granting summary judgment in favor of Utah Transit Authority ( "UTA") and dismissing, 
with prejudice, SLCS's counterclaims against UTA. The trial court's order was appealed 
to the Utah Supreme Court, which transferred the appeal to this Court. This Court has 
jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to section 78-2a-3(2)(j) of the Utah Code. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court correctly interpret the Administration and Coordination 
Agreement between UTA and SLCS in concluding that SLCS assumed sole responsibility 
for the maintenance, repair, and renewal of the railway trackage at issue? 
2. Did the trial court correctly interpret the Administration and Coordination 
Agreement in concluding that SLCS is obligated to indemnify UTA for expenses UTA 
incurred in defending claims brought against it for alleged failure to maintain properly the 
railway trackage at issue? 
2 
3. Did the trial court correctly dismiss SLCS's counterclaim for 
indemnification from UTA? 
These issued were preserved in the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment. 
[R.156-737, 741-920, 923-949, 962-96]. Each is reviewed for correctness. Taylor v. 
Johnson, 1999 UT 35, f 6, 977 P.2d 479, 480; Circle Airfreight v. Boyce Equipment, 745 
P.2d 828, 829 (Ut.Ct.App. 1987). 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This case involves the enforcement of SLCS's indemnification obligations as set 
forth in the March 31, 1993, Administration and Coordination Agreement ( "Coordination 
Agreement") between UTA and SLCS. The Coordination Agreement delineates the 
respective rights and obligations of UTA and SLCS with respect the use of and operation 
along a section of railroad owned by UTA ("Right of Way" or "trackage"). SLCS's 
obligation to indemnify UTA, as set forth in the Coordination Agreement, was triggered 
when Edward George Goebel and Kathy Goebel commenced an action against UTA and 
SLCS on January 7, 1999, alleging that Mr. Goebel sustained injuries as a result of a 
bicycling accident at a railroad crossing on tl ic Right of \A a.) , Specificall) ., the Goebels 
claimed that the accident occurred because the crossing surface was not properly 
maintained for the safety of the traveling public. 
The Coordination Agreement allocates maintenance responsibilities between 
SLCS and UTA for the R ight -of-Way. Those maintenance respoi isibilities correspond 
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with use - the party using the trackage is required to maintain it. At the time of the 
accident, SLCS was the sole operator on the relevant portion of the Right-of-Way. As the 
sole operator, SLCS assumed responsibility for maintenance. SLCS likewise assumed the 
risk of loss and agreed to indemnify UTA for any loss or damage arising in connection 
with the performance of, or failure to perform, its maintenance obligations. Because the 
Goebel's sued UTA for failing properly to maintain and repair the surface of the crossing, 
SLCS is obligated to indemnify UTA for the costs incurred in defending and settling the 
Goebel suit. 
SLCS refused to indemnify and defend UTA. Instead, UTA was required to 
defend itself against the Goebel's claims, ultimately incurring $163,190.69 in attorneys' 
fees and costs. Shortly before trial, the Goebels settled with UTA for $75,000. SLCS 
opted not to settle with the Goebels. While eventually obtaining a directed verdict in its 
favor, SLCS paid more than $500,000 to defend against the Goebels' claims. 
Following the disposition of the Goebel suit, UTA brought this action seeking 
indemnification from SLCS for the cost of settlement as well as its attorneys' fees and 
costs. In response, SLCS filed a counterclaim seeking indemnification from UTA based 
on a proposed alternative interpretation of the Coordination Agreement. 
B. Disposition at the Trial Court. 
On cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court granted summary 
judgment to UTA. A copy of the trial court's Ruling and Order, and the subsequent 
Judgment, are included in the Addendum as Exhibits B and C respectively. The court 
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ruled that, under the clear terms of the Coordination Agreement, SLCS was obligated to 
maintain and repair the crossing at the time in question and therefore was required to 
indemnify UTA for any and all loss or damage incurred in defending the Goebel suit. [R. 
970-71]. The court explained that the clear intent of the parties, as revealed both by the 
language of the Coordination Agreement and by the parties' course of conduct, was "that 
the entity in control of a particular aspect of trackage was to be the entity responsible for 
maintaining it." [R. 971]. At the time in question, SLCS was in control of the trackage at 
issue, and UTA was not, and had not been, using any part of that trackage. The court 
further ruled that the allocation of maintenance obligations was absolute and that UTA 
had not reserved any maintenance duties with respect to the trackage for the period at 
issue. [R. 967-69]. 
Further, the court explained that "UTA's loss resulted from the maintenance, 
construction, operations or other acts or omissions of [SLCS], because the section of the 
track where the accident occurred was within [SLCS's] control at the time . . . ." 
Therefore, "the Coordination Agreement requires that [SLCS] indemnify UTA for its 
payment of that obligation." [R. 971]. The agreement requires indemnification 
regardless of any actual negligence on the part of the responsible party [ R 9 71] 
The trial court rejected SLCSR's argument that it was only obligated to maintain 
the Joint Trackage to the standards it deemed necessary for freight operations. Rather, 
Secion 3.3 of the Coordination Agreement specifically required that SLCSR perform the 
maintenance of the Joint Trackage in a good and workman like manner and in compliance 
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with all applicable laws and regulations. [R. 966]. The trial court also rejected SLCSR's 
argument that UTA retained the primary duty of maintenance for the Joint Trackage: 
Granted [SLCS] had limited use in terms of time and days, and UTA 
retained ownership as well as substantial control in other ways, but the 
burden of maintenance fell upon the party using the tracks under the 
agreement and according to the intent of the parties. 
[R. 967]. UTA did "did not make itself of guarantor of [SLCS's] exercise of 
discretion in the manner of maintenance or repair of the joint trackage" for the 
period of time in question. [R. 968]. 
The trial court held that the Coordination Agreement clearly provides that 
the party responsible for the maintenance also assumes the risk, or liability, 
associated with the performance of these obligations. When reading Sections 3.3 
and 7.2 of the Coordination Agreement in conjunction with the course of conduct 
of the parties, it is clear that SLCS is obligated to indemnify UTA for all loss and 
damages sustained by UTA in defending the Goebel suit. [R. 970-71]. SLCS is 
obligated to indemnify UTA regardless of any duties UTA may owe under the law 
and regardless of any negligence on the part of UTA. [R. 971]. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
SLCS's statement of facts is incomplete. The following sets forth the relevant, 
undisputed background facts, the history of the ownership of and operation on the Right-
of-Way, and the rulings by the trial court and the Utah Supreme Court in the underlying 
case. 
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A. Execution of the Coordination Agreement. 
On October 30, 1992, UTA and Union Pacific Railroad Company entered into a 
Purchase and Sale Agreement ("PSA") whereby UTA acquired from Union Pacific a 
23.55 mile railroad Right-of-Way that stretched from approximately 900 South in Salt 
Lake City South to the Utah County line. UTA acquired the Right-of-Way for its 
anticipated light rail project. [R. 228]. 
UTA acquired the Right-of-Way subject to a "Retained Freight Operating 
Easement," which was intended to permit the easement-holder to operate regular freight 
service along the Right-of-Way. [R. 229]. A copy of the Retained Freight Operating 
Easement is included in the Addendum as Exhibit D. In a separate transaction with 
Union Pacific, SLCS assumed and acquired the rights to all of Union Pacific's retained 
interests, freight interests, and all other rights to the trackage that are considered 
necessary for freight rail service. [R. 229]. 
SLCS's purchase of the Retained Freight Operating Easement enabled SLCS to 
operate freight service on the Right-of-Way and to service approximately 30 freight 
customers along the route. According to SLCS, the Retained Freight Operating Easement 
gave SLCS exclusive use of the Right-of-Way until UTA eventually commenced 
passenger service in late 1999. [R. 229]. 
Because UTA and SLCS both held certain interests in the Right-of-Way, the 
parties entered into Coordination Agreement "to clarify and establish the parties' 
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respective rights and obligations" with regard to the Right-of-Way. [R. 229]. A copy of 
the Coordination Agreement is included in the Addendum as Exhibit E. 
The Coordination Agreement divides the Right-of-Way into three separate track 
designations: Freight Trackage, Passenger Trackage, and Joint Trackage. (See 
Coordination Agreement §§3,5). Freight Trackage was to be used solely by SLCS to 
conduct freight rail service. (Id. § 5.2). Passenger Trackage was to be used solely by 
UTA to conduct passenger service, once it completed the light rail construction project. 
(Id. §5.1). Joint Trackage eventually was to be used jointly by UTA and SLCS (id. § 
5.3), but was to be used exclusively by SLCS until UTA commenced passenger service in 
1999. The crossing at 1700 South, where the Goebel accident occurred, consisted entirely 
of Joint Trackage. [R. 230]. 
B. Assignment of Maintenance Obligations Under the Agreement. 
The Coordination Agreement assigns the responsibility for the maintenance, repair, 
and renewal of the Right-of-Way, including the track, grade crossings, and signal 
facilities. Not surprisingly, the responsibility for the maintenance, repair, and renewal of 
the trackage directly coincides with its use; namely, the party using the track assumed sole 
responsibility for the maintenance of that track. Thus, UTA was solely responsible for 
maintenance of the Passenger Trackage (Coordination Agreement § 3.2) and SLCS was 
solely responsible for maintenance of the Freight Trackage (Id. § 3.1). 
With respect to Joint Trackage, SLCS intended to provide freight rail service on 
the Joint Trackage immediately, but UTA would not commence passenger service on the 
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Joint Trackage until several years later. The Coordination Agreement therefore provides 
that SLCS initially would be solely responsible for all maintenance, repair, and renewal of 
the Joint Trackage. According to Section 3.3 of the Coordination Agreement: 
SLS shall be responsible for the maintenance, repair and renewal of the 
Joint Trackage and shall maintain, repair and renew the same to the 
standards it deems necessary for Freight Rail Service; provided that SLS 
shall, at a minimum, maintain, repair and renew the Joint Trackage so as to 
preserve the present condition of the track, grade crossings and signal 
facilities, as described in Exhibit "B" hereto. Nothing herein shall relieve 
SLS of the obligation to perform maintenance, repair and renewal on the 
Joint Trackage in a good and workman-like manner and in compliance with 
all applicable laws and regulations. 
(Id. § 3.3).1 When UTA commenced passenger service, and both parties were using the 
Joint Trackage, responsibility for maintenance shifted to UTA: 
Upon written notice to SLS at any time, but at least sixty (60) days prior to 
commencement of Passenger Service, UTA shall undertake and assume all 
costs of maintenance, repair and renewal of the Joint Trackage. 
(Id. § 3.4). Thus, until UTA commenced passenger service (or gave SLCS written notice 
of its intent to do so), SLCS was solely responsible for the maintenance, repair, and 
renewal of the Joint Trackage. 
C. Indemnification Obligations Under the Coordination Agreement. 
The Coordination Agreement also allocates risk and liability. Specifically, the 
agreement provides that the party responsible, under the agreement, for the maintenance, 
1
 SLCS's maintenance obligations are also set forth in the Memorandum of Agreements 
and Understandings (the "Memorandum"), executed on December 17, 1997. The 
Memorandum required, among other things, that SLCS conduct weekly inspections of the 
main portion of the Right-of-Way, including the crossing in question. [R. 233]. 
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repair, and renewal of the trackage, also assumed all liability for any loss or damage 
resulting from or arising in connection with such duties. Section 7.2 of the Coordination 
Agreement provides in pertinent part: 
Notwithstanding (i) anything else contained in this Coordination 
Agreement or (ii) other applicable law regarding allocation of liability 
based on fault or otherwise, as between the parties hereto liability for Loss 
or Damage resulting from or arising in connection with the maintenance 
construction, operation or other acts or omissions of either party shall be 
borne and paid by the parties as follows: 
(a) When such Loss or Damage results from or arises in connection with the 
maintenance, construction, operations or other acts or omissions of only 
one of the parties, regardless of any third party involvement, such Loss 
or Damage shall be borne by that party 
Section 7.3 further provides that: 
Each party agrees that it will pay for all Loss or Damage the risk of which it 
has herein assumed, the judgment of any court to the contrary and otherwise 
applicable law regarding liability notwithstanding, and will forever 
indemnify, protect, defend and hold harmless the other party, its successors 
and assigns, from such payment. 
It is undisputed that at the time of the Goebel accident, UTA had not yet 
commenced passenger service on the Right-of-Way, nor had UTA given written notice 
that it intended to assume maintenance responsibilities along the Joint Trackage. [R. 231-
32]. The Goebel accident occurred on February 19, 1998. [R. 231-32]. Passenger 
service along the Right-of-Way did not commence until December 1999. [R. 232]. In an 
Amended Administration and Coordination Agreement, executed on October 18, 1999, 
the parties agreed that the transfer of maintenance obligations would occur on December 
4, 1999. [R. 232]. 
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Thus, up to the time of the Goebel accident in February 1998, and from that time 
through December 4, 1999, SLCS was solely responsible for maintaining, repairing, and 
renewing the Joint Trackage, including the track, grade crossings, and signal facilities. 
D, SLCS's Conduct Prior to the Goebel Accident 
From 1993 until 1999, SLCS assumed sole responsibility for the inspection and 
maintenance of the track, grade crossings and signal facilities in accordance with the 
terms of the Coordination Agreement. SLCS not only conducted regular inspections and 
maintenance along the Joint Trackage, SLCS assumed responsibility for damages as a 
result of certain defective conditions along the Right-of-Way. [R. 233-37.] At no time 
did SLCS object to or question its obligations under the Coordination Agreement to 
inspect, maintain, repair, and renew the track, grade crossings, and signal facilities. [R. 
233-37]. 
1. SLCS Inspected and Maintained the Joint Trackage. 
To comply with its maintenance obligations under the Coordination Agreement, 
SLCS hired a track inspector to inspect and maintain the trackage. SLCS hired John 
Martinez as its track inspector in January 1998. [R. 234]. SLCS's CEO testified that Mr. 
2 
UTA rebuilt many of the crossings on the Right-of-Way as part of its light rail 
construction process. As construction commenced on individual crossings, UTA 
voluntarily assumed responsibility, on a case-by-case basis, for those individual crossings. 
[R. 232n.3]. It is undisputed, however, that construction on the crossing at 1700 South 
did not begin until at least five months after the Goebel accident, and UTA therefore had 
not assumed any responsibility for that crossing at any time prior to the accident. [R.232]. 
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Martinez was hired to inspect the Right-of-Way to ensure that it was in compliance with 
all applicable laws: 
Q. Now on top of these fellows [individuals with the Utah Department 
of Transportation and the Federal Railway Administration], you also had 
Mr. Martinez inspecting? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And I take it he was to inspect to make sure that you were in 
compliance with the federal regulations? 
A. That's correct. 




Mr. Martinez inspected the entire Joint Trackage every week. [R. 234]. 
According to his inspection reports, Mr. Martinez inspected the entire line, including the 
crossing at 1700 South, on February 16, 1998, three days before the Goebel accident. [R. 
234]. 
Mr. Martinez testified that it was his responsibility to repair anything on the track 
or the crossings that was unsafe: 
Q. ... You agree that it was your responsibility as a track inspector for 
Salt Lake City Southern to take care of things that were unsafe that you 
noticed on the crossing -
A. Yes. 
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Q. - surface, whether it was for trains going parallel with the rails or 
people, including bicyclists, for that matter, going across the rails; correct? 
A. Yes. 
A. Yes, I told you in Sandy and Draper, I fixed the crossings, because it 
was dangerous to the public. 
[R. 235]. 
Mr. Martinez further testified: 
Q. ... Do you agree that while you were a track inspector for Salt Lake 
City Southern that you had the responsibility to look for conditions 
on the rubber crossing surface at this intersection, or at this crossing, 
17th South and about Second West in Salt Lake City, that might 
present a dangerous situation to people going across the tracks, 
including bicyclists? 
A. Yes. 
[R. 235 (emphasis added)]. During this time frame, Mr. Martinez repaired, on behalf of 
SLCS, other crossings along the Right-of-Way. [R. 236]. 
2. SLCS Paid Claims Arising from Maintenance of the Joint 
Trackage. 
In addition to inspecting and maintaining the Joint Trackage, SLCS assumed 
responsibility for damages that occurred as a result of defective conditions along the Joint 
Trackage. [R. 236-37]. For example, prior to the Goebel accident, SLCS paid a claim to 
a woman who claimed that the crossing gate had fallen and hit her window. [R 236]. 
SLCS also paid a claim to a motorist that had a flat tire from hitting a spike on one of the 
crossings. [R. 236-37]. Additionally, when UTA received claims from private citizens, it 
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referred these claims to SLCS. [R. 237]. SLCS did not object to paying for or otherwise 
resolving such claims. [R. 237]. 
E. Goebel Lawsuit and Decision. 
The underlying suit, Goebel v. Omni Products, Inc., was commenced against UTA, 
SLCS, and other defendants on January 7, 1999. In their complaint, Edward Goebel and 
his wife Kathy Goebel sought to recover for injuries Mr. Goebel suffered in a bicycling 
accident. According to the Goebels' complaint, Mr. Goebel's accident occurred at the 
railroad crossing at 250 West and 1700 South. The Goebels' alleged, among other things, 
that UTA and SLCS had failed to maintain the crossing, and that such failure caused or 
contributed to Mr. Goebel's injuries. [R. 237-38]. Specifically, the Goebels alleged that 
UTA and SLCS "owed to Plaintiffs duties of reasonable care with respect to maintaining 
the subject railroad crossing in good and safe condition for bicycle traffic." [R. 238]. 
Thus, the essence of the Goebel's claim against UTA and SLCS was an alleged failure to 
maintain adequately the crossing surface on the Joint Trackage. [R. 237-38]. 
F. Disposition of the Goebel Suit, 
Prior to trial, and after incurring more than $160,000 in attorneys' fees and costs, 
UTA settled with the Goebels for $75,000. [R. 239]. Rather than settle, SLCS took the 
case to trial, ultimately spending more than $500,000 in attorneys' fees and costs to 
defend the case. Before submitting the case to the jury, the trial court granted SLCS's 
motion for directed verdict. Goebel v. Salt Lake City Southern Railroad Co., 2004 UT 
80, % 8, 104 P.3d at 1185 (referring to trial court's ruling) (a copy of the Supreme Court's 
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opinion in Goebel is included in the addendum as Exhibit F). The trial court ruled that 
SLCS owed a duty, under Utah law, to maintain the crossing at 1700 South for the safety 
of the traveling public because SLCS operates a freight railway along the Right-of-Way. 
Id, Nonetheless, the Goebels failed to present any evidence that SLCS had prior notice of 
the alleged defect, thus precluding a finding of negligence. Id. ^ 1, 14, 104 P.3d at 1185, 
1191. The trial court also found that the Goebels failed to present any evidence or eye-
witness testimony that the accident occurred as the Goebels alleged. Id. f 7, 104 P.3d at 
1189. 
The Goebels appealed the directed verdict in favor of SLCS, and SLCS appealed 
the trial court's ruling that SLCS owed a statutory duty of care to the Goebels as a railway 
operator. On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's directed verdict in 
favor of SLCS, and also affirmed the trial court's ruling that SLCS is a "railway 
company" within the meaning of the statutes discussed above. The Supreme Court held: 
We agree with the Goebels and the trial court that these statutes, by their 
plain language, imposed a duty upon Southern to keep the crossing safe for 
the traveling public. Although Southern's operation of the railroad tracks in 
question is limited to freight service pursuant to the easement, and is 
governed by the Agreement, Southern is nonetheless a railroad company 
operating a "railway" within the meaning of the statutes, because it operates 
trains upon the railroad tracks. ... As the trial court explained, the 
"'operating a railway' language . . . is broad enough to encompass 
Southern's operation, use and utilization of the easement that they had 
supported by the evidence in this particular case." Only different statutory 
language or different factual circumstances could convince us that 
Southern's regular and longstanding use and control of trains on the railway 
did not amount to operation of a railway. The trial court therefore correctly 
interpreted the statutes in this regard. 
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Goebel 2004 UT 80, % 16, 104 P.3d at 1191 (emphasis added). Because SLCS had a 
statutory duty to the Goebels, the Supreme Court declined to consider whether SLCS 
owed them a duty under the Coordination Agreement. Id. |^ 33, 104 P.3d at 1196. 
G. Cross-claims for Indemnification. 
Shortly after the Goebel lawsuit was filed, UTA gave notice to SLCS, pursuant to 
Section 7.5 of the Coordination Agreement, and demanded that SLCS defend and 
indemnify UTA with respect to the claim. [R. 238]. SLCS refused. [R. 238]. SLCS 
likewise demanded that UTA indemnify, defend and hold harmless SLCS from all losses 
and damages with respect to the Goebel lawsuit. [R. 238]. UTA rejected SLCS's 
demand because, under the circumstances, UTA had no duty to indemnify or defend 
SLCS. [R. 238-39]. 
UTA therefore filed this action seeking indemnification from SLCS for the 
amounts paid to defend and settle the Goebel lawsuit. [R. 239]. SLCS counterclaimed 
for indemnification of its defense costs. [R. 239]. The case was decided on cross-
motions for summary judgment. Both parties agree there are no disputed issues of 
material fact, and this case may be decided as a matter of law. (SLCS Br. at 24). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court correctly ruled that SLCS is required to indemnify UTA for its costs 
of defending and settling the Goebel lawsuit. In the Coordination Agreement, the parties 
allocated among themselves responsibility for maintaining, repairing, and renewing the 
railroad crossing where the Goebel accident occurred. Those maintenance 
responsibilities correspond with the parties use of the trackage - when one party alone 
was operating on the trackage, that party was responsible to maintain it. It is undisputed 
that SLCS alone was operating on the Joint Trackage at the time of the accident, and 
SLCS alone had the responsibility to maintain it. 
Each of SLCS's attempts to avoid that responsibility should be rejected. The 
parties did not agree that SLCS was responsible only to maintain the original condition of 
the track, nor did they agree that SLCS was responsible only to maintain it to the 
standards it deemed necessary for freight rail service. Instead, SLCS undertook to 
maintain the railroad crossings in "good" condition, and to comply with "all applicable 
laws and regulations." (Coordination Agreement § 3.3). Those "laws and regulations" 
include the state statutes that the Goebels relied upon to sue UTA and SLCS. The Utah 
Supreme Court has held that those statutes required SLCS to maintain the crossing in a 
safe condition for bicycle traffic, and that SLCS owed Mr. Goebel a duty of care to do so. 
joebel 2004 UT 80, fflf 16-17, 104 P.3d at 1191. Nothing in the Coordination 
Agreement limits SLCS's ability to satisfy this duty of care and SLCS, by its conduct, 
emonstrated that it had agreed to do so. Likewise, nothing in the Coordination 
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Agreement assigns that responsibility to UTA. Instead, the parties agreed that SLCS -
and SLCS alone - would make sure the crossing satisfied these requirements. 
The Goebels claimed that SLCS and UTA failed to do so. Because the Goebels 
claim "arises in connection with" an alleged failure to maintain adequately the railroad 
crossing, and because SLCS alone undertook to maintain that crossing, SLCS had a duty 
to indemnify and defend UTA. (Coordination Agreement § 7.2(a)). The fact that SLCS 
ultimately prevailed is irrelevant - the duty to defend and indemnify attaches irrespective 
of fault or negligence. 
The trial court properly granted summary judgment to UTA, and properly 
dismissed SLCS's counterclaim. That decision should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
L SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF UTA WAS PROPER BECAUSE, 
UNDER THE CLEAR TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT, SLCS ASSUMED 
ALL MAINTENANCE OBLIGATIONS, 
The trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of UTA because, 
under the clear terms of the Coordination Agreement, SLCS assumed responsibility for 
maintaining the Joint Trackage. As discussed, the maintenance obligations coincided 
with the use of the Joint Trackage. At the time in question, SLCS was the sole operator 
along both the Freight Trackage and Joint Trackage and therefore was solely responsible 
for the maintenance of both. The clear language of the Coordination Agreement in 
conjunction with the applicable statutes and ordinances provides that SLCS was required, 
at a minimum, to maintain the Joint Trackage in good condition and to ensure it was safe 
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for the traveling public. Nothing in the Coordination Agreement limited SLCS's 
maintenance obligations. Likewise, neither statute nor common law relieve SLCS of the 
obligations it assumed. 
A. Maintenance, Repair, and Renewal Obligations Correspond with the 
Use of the Tracks, 
Under the Coordination Agreement, SLCS had the exclusive right to conduct 
freight rail operations along the Right-of-Way, and UTA had the exclusive right to 
conduct passenger service. Because UTA would not commence passenger service until 
several years later, however, SLCS effectively had exclusive use of both the Freight 
Trackage and Joint Trackage at the time in question. 
In setting forth the exclusive rights of use, the parties also expressly delineated the 
maintenance obligations for the Right-of-Way, and those maintenance obligations 
correspond directly with the use of the track. Because SLCS had exclusive use of the 
Freight Trackage (Coordination Agreement § 5.2), Section 3.1 of the agreement gives 
SLCS sole maintenance responsibility for that trackage. It states: 
SLS shall be responsible for the maintenance, repair and renewal of the 
Freight Trackage and shall maintain, repair and renew the same to the 
standards it deems necessary for Freight Rail Service; provided that SLS 
shall, at a minimum, maintain, repair and renew the Freight Trackage so as 
to preserve the present condition of the track, grade crossings and signal 
facilities, as described on Exhibit "B" hereto. SLS shall bear all costs and 
expenses of maintenance, repair and renewal of the Freight Trackage. 
Nothing herein shall relieve SLS of the obligation to perform maintenance, 
repair and renewal on the Freight Trackage in a good and workman-like 
manner and in compliance with all applicable laws and regulations. 
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Likewise, because UTA had exclusive use of the Passenger Trackage (Id. § 5.1), Section 
3.2 of the agreement gives UTA sole maintenance responsibility for that trackage. It 
states: 
UTA shall be responsible for the maintenance, repair and renewal of the 
Passenger Trackage and shall maintain, repair and renew the same to the 
standards it deems necessary for Passenger Service; UTA shall bear all 
costs and expenses of maintenance, repair and renewal of the Passenger 
Trackage. 
With respect to Joint Trackage, SLCS had exclusive use until UTA commenced 
passenger service in late 1999. After that, both parties could use the Joint Trackage, 
subject to the terms of the agreement. (Id. § 5.3). Thus, SLCS initially was solely 
responsible for maintenance. Section 3.3 of the Coordination Agreement - the provision 
at issue here - states: 
SLS shall be responsible for and shall pay the cost of the maintenance, 
repair and renewal of the Joint Trackage and shall maintain, repair and 
renew the same to the standards it deems necessary for Freight Rail 
Service; provided that SLS shall, at a minimum, maintain, repair and renew 
the Joint Trackage so as to preserve the present condition of track, grade 
crossings and signal facilities, as described on Exhibit "ET hereto. Nothing 
herein shall relieve SLS of the obligation to perform maintenance, repair 
and renewal on the Joint Trackage in a good and workman-like manner and 
in compliance with all applicable laws and regulations. 
That responsibility shifted to UTA when it commenced passenger service: 
Upon written notice to SLS at any time, but at least sixty (60) days prior to 
commencement of Passenger Service, UTA shall undertake and assume all 
costs of maintenance, repair and renewal of the Joint Trackage. 
(WL§3.4.) 
20 
It is undisputed that the Goebel accident occurred on the Joint Trackage, and that it 
occurred long before UTA commenced passenger service. Therefore, at the time of the 
accident, SLCS was solely responsible for maintenance of the 1700 South crossing. 
This allocation of maintenance responsibility makes sense because the party using 
the track generally is in the best position to maintain, repair, and renew it, and in the best 
position to notice any problems. The party using the track also is in the best position to 
recognize when the track does not meet all of the requirements for the nature of that 
party's use. Indeed, the Coordination Agreement makes numerous references to the 
specific needs of a freight rail operator versus that of a passenger service provider. (See, 
e.g., id. §§ 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4). The Coordination Agreement even provided that, while it 
was the sole operator along the Right-of-Way, SLCS could essentially tailor the 
maintenance of the track to enable SLCS to best fulfill its freight carrier operations, 
provided, of course, that SLCS maintain the present condition of the track and fully 
comply with all applicable laws and regulations. (Id. § 3.3). 
B. Under the Agreement SLCS was Responsible to Maintain, Repair, and 
Renew the Crossing At Issue in Good Condition and in Accordance 
with All Laws and Regulations, 
SLCS's principal argument is that Section 3.3 of the agreement only required it to 
taintain the crossings "to the standards it deems necessary for Freight Rail Service," and 
iminating the gaps in the rubber pads that that allegedly caused Mr. Goebers accident 
is not necessary for freight rail service. (SLCS Br. at 28-31). SLCS, however, 
erlooks the balance of Section 3.3, which imposes far broader maintenance obligations. 
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Section 3.3, for example, requires SLCS to maintain the maintain the track and grade 
crossings in "good" condition. It further provides that SLCS must perform its obligations 
"in compliance with all applicable laws and regulations." (Coordination Agreement § 
3.3). 
1. SLCS Agreed to Maintain the Crossings in "Good" Condition. 
The Coordination Agreement required SLCS to "at a minimum, maintain, repair 
and renew the Joint Trackage so as to preserve the present condition of the track, grade 
crossings and signal facilities as described on Exhibit 'B ' hereto." (Coordination 
Agreement § 3.3). Exhibit B to the Coordination Agreement states that the crossings, 
including the crossing at 1700 South, are in "good" condition. Thus, SLCS was not 
limited to maintenance necessary for Freight Rail Service, as it now contends, but was 
instead required, at a minimum, to maintain the crossings in "good" condition. 
2. SLCS Agreed to Maintain and Repair the Crossings in 
Accordance with All Applicable Laws. 
More important, Section 3.3 expressly states that "[njothing herein shall relieve" 
SLCS of its obligation to maintain the crossings "in compliance with all applicable laws 
and regulations." (IdL § 3.3). This language is unequivocal, and SLCS's brief does not 
even attempt to address it. SLCS assumed responsibility for maintaining the Joint 
Trackage in accordance with any and all requirements imposed by federal, state, and local 
law. Thus, to the extent the law required that the crossing be maintained for the safety of 
the traveling public, including bicyclists, SLCS undertook to do so. 
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Under Utah law, a railway company owes a duty of care to maintain the tracks and 
grade crossings along which it operates for the safety of the traveling public. See Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 10-7-26 (2), 10-7-29, 56-1-11; Salt Lake City Code § 14.44.030. 
Specifically, section 10-7-26(2) provides that a "railway company" shall 
keep[ ] every portion of every street and alley used by it and upon or across 
which tracks shall be constructed at or near the grade of such streets in 
good and safe condition for public travel, but it shall keep the same 
planked, paved, macadamized or otherwise in such condition for public 
travel as the governing body of the city or town may from time to time 
direct. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-7-26(2) (2003). "Railway company" is defined as "any company 
which owns or operates railway tracks on, along or across a street or alley in any city or 
town." Id. § 10-7-26(1). Section 10-7-29 likewise provides that 
the tracks of all railway companies when located upon the streets or 
avenues of a city or town shall be kept in repair and safe in all respects for 
the use of the traveling public, and such companies shall be liable for all 
damages resulting by reason of neglect to keep such tracks in repair . . . . 
For injuries to persons or property arising from the failure of any such 
company to keep its tracks in proper repair . . . such company shall be 
liable.. . . 
I § 10-7-29 (2003). For purposes of this section, a "railway company" is defined as 
oth "any company which owns or operated railway tracks," id- § 10-7-26(1), and as any 
>mpany "owning or operating any . . . railway," id- § 10-7-29 (emphasis added). 
SLCS argues at length that it is not a "railway company" within the meaning of 
ese statutes because it did not own the tracks, but merely used them. (SLCS Br. at 25-
iection 56-1-11 of the Utah Code and Section 14.44.030 of the Salt Lake City Code. 
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34). SLCS even makes the surprising statements that "[h]ad UTA and SLCS not entered 
into the Agreement, there would be no question that UTA and only UTA owed any 
statutory duty to Mr. Goebel" and "[a]s between the parties to this Agreement, UTA 
alone, as owner and controller of its railroad, owed the duty imposed by law to 'maintain 
good and sufficient crossings at points where any line of travel crosses its road.'" (SLCS 
Br. at 27, 36). These statements are surprising because less than a year ago the Utah 
Supreme Court specifically held that SLCS owed Mr. Goebel a duty of care under these 
very statutes. Goebel 2004 UT 80, Hf 16-17, 104 P.3d at 1191. 
In Goebel the Utah Supreme Court held that, as the operator of a freight railway 
company, SLCS necessarily had a duty to maintain the crossing at 1700 South for the 
safety of the traveling public, including Mr. Goebel. Id. Indeed, the Goebel court 
explained that 
[o]nly different statutory language or different factual circumstances could 
convince us that [SLCSJ's regular and longstanding use and control of trains on the 
railway did not amount to operation of a railway. 
IdL 
While careful to avoid saying so explicitly, SLCS can prevail here only if this 
Court reverses the Supreme Court's decision in Goebel. This Court should not - indeed 
cannot - do so for at least three reasons. 
First, and foremost, Goebel was correctly decided. The Utah Supreme Court's 
holding is consistent with the clear language of the statutes and ordinances, and is 
consistent with the duties imposed at common law - possessors of land generally have the 
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responsibility for maintenance of the land as well as the liability for injuries arising from 
the land. See Salt Lake City v. Schubach, 159 P.2d 149, 154 (Utah 1945) (tenant in 
exclusive possession has duty to repair); see also D'Errico v. Stop & Shop Co., CV 
950368612, 1997 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2999 *3 (Conn. Super. Nov. 10, 1997) ("It is the 
possession of land that imposes the liability for injuries, rather [than] the ownership of 
land . . . because the person in possession is in a position of control and is best able to 
prevent harm.") SLCS was the sole operator along the Right-of-Way for nearly seven 
years following the execution of the Coordination Agreement. SLCS operated daily 
freight service on the railways, servicing numerous customers along the Right-of-Way. 
Such longstanding use and control of the Right-of-Way for economic gain was the 
primary basis for the Supreme Court's holding that SLCS constituted a railway company 
for purposes of imposing these statutory obligations. Goebel, 2004 UT 80, [^16, 104 P.3d 
at 1191. 
Second, SLCS is barred by the doctrine of issue preclusion from relitigating this 
ssue. Issue preclusion prevents a party from relitigating a "particular issue[ ] that ha[s] 
>een contested and resolved." Macris & Assocs., Inc. v. Neways, Inc., 2000 UT 93, ^[34, 
6 P.3d 1214, 1221-22. Here, the question whether SLCS is a railway company and a 
ailway operator under these statutes, with the duties adherent thereto, was the subject of 
LCS's cross-appeal, and was squarely addressed by the Utah Supreme Court in Goebel. 
he Supreme Court held that SLCS was a "railway company" under the meaning of the 
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statute and had a statutory duty to "keep the crossing safe for the traveling public." 
Goebel 2004 UT 80, ^[16, 104 P.3d at 1191. 
Third, this Court is bound by stare decisis to follow controlling decisions of the 
Utah Supreme Court. State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1259 (Utah 1993) ("This 
doctrine, under which the first decision by a court on a particular question of law governs 
later decisions by the same court, is a cornerstone of Anglo-American jurisprudence that 
is crucial to the predictability of the law and the fairness of adjudication."). Because the 
Utah Supreme Court has held, under these very facts and applying the same statutes, that 
SLCS owed a duty of care to the Goebels, this Court is bound to follow that decision. 
3. Nothing in the Coordination Agreement Limits SLCS's Ability 
to Perform its Maintenance Obligations. 
SLCS next argues that its maintenance obligations under Section 3.3 of the 
Coordination Agreement are necessarily limited by Sections 2.1 and 4.1 of the agreement. 
(SLCS Br. at 32-33). As explained below, these provisions have no application to the 
present dispute and, in any event, must be read in conjunction with the more narrow and 
specific requirements of Section 3.3. 
The fact that the Supreme Court in Goebel cited to a provision of the Coordination 
Agreement that deals with Freight Trackage is inapposite. While the Court in Goebel 
refers to Section 5.2 of the Coordination Agreement, the Court specifically stated that it 
was not interpreting the language of the Coordination Agreement and was not relying on 
the provisions of the Coordination Agreement for its decision. Id, f33, 104 P.3d at 1196. 
Rather, the Court specifically states that SLCS is a "railway company" under the meaning 
of the statute "because it operates trains upon the railroad tracks" and because of its 
"longstanding use and control of trains on the railway," two facts which SLCS does not 
and cannot contest. Id f 16, 104 P.3d at 1191. 
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An agreement "should be read as a whole, in an attempt to harmonize and give 
effect to all of the contract provisions." Lee v. Barnes, 1999 UT App 126, %ll9 977 P.2d 
550, 551 (citations omitted); Webbank v. Am. Gen Annuity Serv., Corp., 2002 UT 88, 
1J18, 54 P.3d 1139, 1144 (explaining that "we consider each contract provision . . . in 
relation to all of the others, with a view toward giving effect to all and ignoring none"). 
"Provisions which are apparently conflicting are to be reconciled and harmonized, if 
possible, by reasonable interpretation so that the entire agreement can be given effect." 
Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Salt Lake City, 740 P.2d 1357, 1359 n.l (Utah Ct. 
App. 1987); accord Cent. Fla. Invs., Inc. v. Parkwest Assocs., 2002 UT 3, fl2-13,40 P.3d 
599, 605. Indeed, it is universally accepted that a court must reject any interpretation 
which will nullify one or more of the contractual provisions. See id- Likewise, courts 
"may not rewrite [a] contract... if the language is clear." Utah Farm Bur. Ins. Co. v. 
Crook, 1999 UT 47, f 6, 980 P.2d 685, 686 (citation omitted). 
SLCS's reliance on Section 2.1 to limit its maintenance obligations is misplaced, 
ndeed, neither Section 2.1, nor any other provision in Section 2 of the agreement, makes 
my reference whatsoever to maintenance, repair, or renewal obligations. Rather, Section 
M (along with Sections 5.1 and 5.4) are intended only to limit the type of business 
ctivities that SLCS can perform on the Right-of-Way, and when it can perform them, 
famely, SLCS can only provide freight rail service, it cannot provide passenger service, 
cannot operate on Passenger Trackage, and it cannot operate on the Joint Trackage 
iring the Passenger Preference Periods without special permission. Section 2.2 (along 
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with Sections 5.2 and 5.5) are the direct corollary - under these provisions, UTA cannot 
provide freight rail service, it cannot operate on Freight Trackage, and it cannot operate 
on the Joint Trackage during the Freight Preference Period without special permission. 
The delineation of permitted business uses on the Right-of-Way cannot be construed in 
any way to limit the express maintenance obligations set forth in Section 3 of the 
agreement. 
Indeed, SLCS's arguments are internally inconsistent. If Section 2.1 is read as 
broadly as SLCS now suggests - that it prohibits SLCS from doing anything on the Right-
of-Way other than provide freight rail service, then it would prohibit SLCS from doing 
any maintenance whatsoever on the trackage. SLCS, however, admits that it was required 
to perform maintenance necessary to preserve the original condition of the track. (SLCS 
Br. at 28). Section 2.1 plainly does not prohibit SLCS from performing maintenance on 
the trackage, and SLCS admits this. These maintenance obligations are addressed in 
Section 3.3 of the agreement, not Section 2.1. 
However, even if Section 2.1 could not reconciled with Section 3.3 (which we 
submit is not the case), Section 3.3 must be given greater weight. In interpreting 
contractual provisions, "'[s]pecific terms and exact terms are given greater weight than 
general language."5 Docutel Olivetti Corp. v. Dick Brady Svs.. 731 P.2d 475,480 (Utah 
1986) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 203(c)). Here, Section 2.1 is a 
general provision providing that SLCS shall only be permitted to conduct Freight Rail 
Service on the Right-of-Way, whereas Section 3.3 specifically sets forth that SLCS shall 
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be responsible for maintaining, repairing, and renewing the track, grade crossings, and 
signal facilities on the Joint Trackage. The specific provisions of Section 3 3 control over 
the general provisions of Section 2.1. 
Likewise, Section 4.1 does not apply to ordinary maintenance and repair work on 
the Joint Trackage. Rather, Section 4.1 simply precludes SLCS from making 
"modifications" without first obtaining UTA's approval. The Coordination Agreement 
defines "modifications" as: 
Alterations or additions to, or removal of, then-existing trackage on the 
Right-of-Way, including but not limited to new connections, and changes in 
railroad communication systems, signal or dispatching facilities. 
(Coordination Agreement § 1). The Goebel case involved an alleged failure to maintain 
properly the rubber panels between the tracks. (SLCS Br. at 8-9). The Goebels did not 
contend that UTA and SLCS were obligated to alter, add to, or remove the "then-existing 
rackage" - i.e., the rails. Indeed, simply changing the rails presumably would have left 
he allegedly defective rubber panels in place. Likewise, the Goebel case had nothing to 
lo with adding connections to the track or changing the "railroad communications 
ystems, signal or dispatching facilities." The Goebel case arose in connection with 
rdinary maintenance, not "modifications" as that term is defined in the agreement. But 
Again, SLCS's argument is internally inconsistent. SLCS admits it was responsible for 
aintenance necessary to preserve the original condition of the track. (SLCS Br. at 28). 
X S does not contend that it was required to obtain UTA's prior written consent to do 
, or that it was required to enter into a Modification Agreement with UTA, as would be 
quired by Section 4.1. Indeed, SLCS regularly maintained the track and crossings 
thout UTA's prior consent, and without a Modification Agreement. [R. 233-37]. 
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even if remedying the alleged negligent state of the crossing at issue in this case required 
"modifications/5 Section 4.1 permits SLCS to undertake such modifications if it 
"reasonably determines that Modifications are required to accommodate its Freight Rail 
Service." (Id, § 4.1). The only way that SLCS would be prohibited from performing such 
modifications would be if UTA denied SLCS's request to do so, and in this case SLCS 
never requested to make any "modifications" to the crossing, and UTA therefore could 
not have denied any such request. 
In summary, the "applicable laws and regulations" referenced in the Coordination 
Agreement require, at a minimum, that SLCS maintain the track and grade crossing in 
question for the safety of the traveling public, including Mr. Goebel. Nothing in the 
Coordination Agreement limited or prevented SLCS from complying with these 
contractual and statutory obligations. 
C. UTA Did Not Retain Any of the Maintenance Obligations for the Joint 
Trackage, Under the Agreement, Statute, or Common Law. 
UTA did not retain, whether through the Coordination Agreement, by operation of 
statute, or by common law, any maintenance obligations for the Joint Trackage for the 
time in question. SLCS does not point to a not a single provision in the Coordination 
Agreement assigning to UTA any of the Joint Trackage maintenance obligations for the 
period of time in question. Rather, section 3.3 unequivocally states that SLCS "shall be 
responsible for and shall pay the costs of the maintenance, repair and renewal of the Joint 
"Modifications" under Section 4.1 plainly do not include ordinary maintenance and 
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Trackage " Nor is there any mention in the Coordination Agreement that UTA is to 
oversee any of SLCS's maintenance obligations. 
Conceding that the Coordination Agreement does not expressly assign to UTA any 
Joint Trackage maintenance obligations for the time in question, SLCS argues that the 
agreement does so by implication. Specifically, SLCS points out that Sections 3.1, 3.2 
and 3.4 include the word "all" when referring to maintenance, but Section 3.3 omits the 
word "all." Based on the omission of this single word, SLCS argues that UTA retained 
some entirely undefined maintenance obligations. (SLCS Br. at 30). SLCS is wrong for 
at least two reasons. First, the term "all," as used in Sections 3.1, 3.2, and 3.4 of the 
Coordination Agreement, refers to the costs and expenses of maintenance and not the 
allocation of the maintenance obligations themselves. Thus, at the very best, the omission 
of this word would be of significance only if this was a dispute over who was obligated to 
Day the costs of maintenance. Second, although not using the term "all," Section 3.3 in 
10 way suggests that SLCS's obligation to perform and bear the costs of maintenance, 
epair, and renewal of the Joint Trackage is anything less than "all." If there was some 
^sidual maintenance obligation that UTA was to bear, the parties surely would have said 
:>mething about it. 
The fact that Utah law may impose maintenance obligations on both UTA, as the 
vner of a track, and on SLCS, as the operator of a railroad along the track, does not 
ean that UTA necessarily retained some of the Joint Trackage maintenance obligations. 
3air. 
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There is absolutely nothing in the statutes or common law that prevents parties from 
assigning all of the obligations, as well as the liability for these obligations, to one party. 
This is precisely what UTA and SLCS did here.6 Indeed, that is the very purpose of 
indemnification agreements - to require one party to assume the risk arising with respect 
to specific contractual duties. SLCS's assumption of the maintenance obligations of the 
Joint Trackage, as well as the liability for all damages arising in connection with these 
obligations, in no way affected the rights of any third parties, and was not contrary to 
public policy. Therefore, absent an express statutory prohibition, UTA and SLCS were 
free to delegate all of the Joint Trackage maintenance obligations, as well as the attendant 
liability, to SLCS. 
In summary, nothing in the language of the Coordination Agreement provides that 
UTA retained any maintenance obligations with regard to the Joint Trackage. Likewise, 
neither Utah statute nor Utah common law impose any owner-specific maintenance 
obligations that were not and could not be contractually assumed by SLCS. 
D. SLCS, By Its Conduct, Acknowledged These Responsibilities* 
The intent of UTA and SLCS is best evidenced by the parties' conduct under the 
Coordination Agreement prior to this dispute. SLCS's performance under the agreement, 
6
 In its Brief, SLCS argues that "[njothing in the statutes or the ordinance relied upon by 
the Goebels suggest that the owner of the tracks can delegate the duty imposed upon it by 
those enactments so as to be free from its statutory and ordinance based responsibilities." 
(SLCS Br. at 27 (emphasis added)). This argument misses the point. UTA is not 
claiming that delegating statutory duties to SLCS freed it from those duties (though, as 
discussed below, it is not clear whether UTA had them in the first place). Instead, UTA is 
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prior to this dispute, demonstrates that the parties intended for SLCS to assume all 
maintenance obligations for the Joint Trackage at the time in question, and the consequent 
liability for allegedly failing to do so. "[I]n the interpretation of contracts, the 
interpretation given by the parties themselves as shown by their acts will be adopted by 
the court." Hardinge Co. v. EIMCO Corpr 266 P.2d 494, 496 (Utah 1964): see also Old 
Colony Trust Co. v. Omaha, 230 U.S. 100, 118 (1913) (practical interpretation by parties 
to contract is "compelling"); Teachers Insur. & Annuity Assoc, of Am. v. Ocwne 
Financial Corp., No. 98 Civ. 7137, 2000 U.S. Dist LEXIS 2560, at *22 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 
19, 2002) ("Perhaps the most persuasive evidence of the intention of the parties when 
entering an agreement is their course of performance under the agreement."). 
Here, the intention of both SLCS and UTA is plainly evidenced by their course of 
>erformance. This course of performance should be "deemed of great, if not compelling 
tifluence." Old Colony Trust Co., 230 U.S. at 118. 
SLCS, in large part, adhered to its maintenance obligations through 1999 by 
ispecting the Joint Trackage on a regular basis, by repairing portions of the Joint 
rackage, and by assuming sole liability for claims arising with respect to the Joint 
rackage. Despite its current claim that Section 3.3 did not require it to do so, SLCS 
nducted regular inspections of the Joint Trackage, including the track, grade crossings, 
d signal facilities, and also regularly repaired the Joint Trackage. SLCS hired Mr. 
irtinez to perform weekly inspections of the entire track line and to perform the 
iming that SLCS agreed to defend and indemnify UTA if it is sued for violating them. 
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necessary repairs on the track and grade crossings. SLCS inspected the Right-of-Way, 
including the crossing in question, just three days prior to the Goebel accident. Perhaps 
most significant, Mr. Martinez testified that he believed he had "the responsibility to look 
for conditions on the rubber crossing surface at this intersection, or at this crossing, 17 
South and about Second West in Salt Lake City, that might present a dangerous situation 
to people going across the tracks, including bicyclists." [R. 235 (emphasis added)]. 
SLCS also repaired grade crossings on the Joint Trackage both before and after the 
Goebel accident. [R. 236]. In addition to inspecting and repairing the crossings, SLCS 
paid claims arising out of defects in crossings on the Joint Trackage. Specifically, 
SLCRS paid a claim to a woman who claimed that a crossing gate had fallen and hit the 
window of her car. SLCS also paid to replace a tire where the motorist claimed that a 
spike at a crossing damaged the motorist's tire. [R. 236-37]. In neither instance did 
SLCS see fit even to inform UTA that it was doing so; SLCS apparently was so confident 
of its obligations that it did not believe UTA even needed to know about it. UTA, for its 
part, performed accordingly - when issues were brought to UTA's attention by third 
parties, UTA forwarded this information directly to SLCS, who handled them without 
dispute. [R. 237]. 
SLCS's and UTA's course of performance under the Coordination Agreement is of 
"compelling influence," Old Colony Trust Co.. 230 U.S. at 118, and the "interpretation 
given by the parties themselves as shown by their acts [should] be adopted by the court." 
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Hardinge, 266 P.2d at 494. This alone is sufficient to affirm the trial court's grant of 
summary judgment to UTA. 
II. SLCS AGREED TO INDEMNIFY UTA FOR ANY LOSS ARISING IN 
CONNECTION WITH MAINTENANCE OF JOINT TRACKAGE. 
A. The Plain Language of the Agreement Requires SLCS to Indemnify 
UTA. 
The Coordination Agreement establishes who shall be liable to a third party injured 
due to the act or omission, whether negligent or not, of one of the parties. (Coordination 
Agreement § 7.2.) Specifically, section 7.2 provides: 
Notwithstanding (i) anything else contained in this Coordination 
Agreement or (ii) otherwise applicable law regarding allocation of liability 
based on fault or otherwise, as between the parties hereto liability for Loss 
or Damage resulting from or in connection with the maintenance, 
construction, operations or other acts or omissions of either party shall be 
borne and paid by the parties as follows: 
(a) When such Loss or Damage results from or arises in connection with 
the maintenance, construction, operations or other acts or omissions of 
only one of the parties, regardless of any third party involvement, such 
Loss or Damage shall be borne by that party 
he Coordination Agreement further provides that 
Each party agrees that it will pay for all Loss or Damage the risk of which 
it has herein assumed, the judgment of any court to the contrary and 
otherwise applicable law regarding liability notwithstanding, and will 
forever indemnify, protect, defend and hold harmless the other party, its 
successors and assigns, from such payment. 
L § 7.3.) 
It is uncontested that the Goebel suit arose in connection with the 
intenance of, or other acts or omissions with respect to, the Joint Trackage, and 
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that UTA incurred losses and damages as a result of the Goebel suit. As explained 
above, SLCS - not UTA - was required to maintain the crossing. Thus, UTA's 
loss or damage arose "in connection with the . . . acts or omissions of only 
[SLCS]" and UTA is entitled to indemnification. 
B. SLCS Incorrectly Claims that the Agreement Precludes 
Indemnification. 
SLCS first argues that this Court must ignore the Supreme Court's holding in 
Goebel because Section 7.1 of the Coordination Agreement states that "[e]ach party 
agrees that it will pay for all Loss or Damage the risk of which it has herein assumed, the 
judgment of any court to the contrary and otherwise applicable law regarding liability 
notwithstanding . . . . " (SLCS Br. at 39-40). SLCS is wrong for at least two reasons: 
First, SLCS's entire argument is premised on the (incorrect) assumption that UTA, and 
UTA alone, was responsible for maintenance necessary to comply with applicable statutes 
and ordinances. (SLCS Br. at 36). Because Goebel squarely held the opposite, this Court 
cannot ignore that holding, and erroneously proceed from SLCS's faulty premise. 
Second, this provision would apply only if UTA had remained in the case, and only if 
UTA had been found liable. In those circumstances, SLCS would be required to 
indemnify UTA notwithstanding a jury's determination that UTA was at fault. 
SLCS next claims that if this Court applies the ruling in Goebel the Court must 
find that neither party is entitled to indemnification under the Coordination Agreement. 
(SLCS Br. at 39-40). Because this argument is raised for the first time on appeal, the 
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Court should decline to consider it. State v. Arguelles, 2003 UT 1, f41, 63 P.3d 731, 744 
("[I]ssues not raised at trial cannot be argued for the first time on appeal . . . . unless the 
petitioner demonstrates that 'plain error' occurred or 'exceptional circumstances exist." 
(citations omitted)). 
Not only did SLCS fail to raise this issue below, this argument is without merit for 
at least two reasons. First SLCS's argument incorrectly assumes that the Goebel decision 
necessary applies the same statutory duties to UTA. The Goebel decision, however, in no 
way addresses UTA's statutory duties with regard to the crossing in question. The 
Goebel decision applies only to SLCS's statutory duties to maintain the Joint Trackage, 
md the crossings, for the safety of the traveling public. 2004 UT ^ 16, 104 P.3d at 1191. 
Hie court explained that its holding was fact-specific, and was informed by the fact that 
1LCS "operates trains upon the railroad tracks" and had a history of "regular and 
mgstanding use and control of the trains on the railway." Id. The same was not true of 
TA. At the time in question, UTA was not regularly operating trains along the Right-of-
ray. In fact, UTA did not commence passenger service along the Right-of-Way until 
>99, nearly seven years after purchasing the Right-of-Way. Thus, Goebel did not 
dress UTA's statutory duties, if any, and does not preclude a finding of 
lemnification. 
Second, and even more fundamental, even if UTA owed the Goebels the same 
utory duties as SLCS, SLCS's argument incorrectly assumes that such statutory duties 
e not and could not be assigned among the parties by private agreement. Under the 
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Coordination Agreement, SLCS assumed all obligations relating to the maintenance, 
repair, and renewal of the Joint Trackage, including all duties imposed by statute. 
(Coordination Agreement § 3.3.) There is no legal prohibition against delegating this 
responsibility via private agreement. Rather, Utah law recognizes the right of two parties 
to assign the risk of liability to third parties between themselves. See Freund v. Utah 
Power & Light Co., 793 P.2d 362, 370 (Utah 1990).7 Thus, even if both parties owed a 
duty of care to the Goebels, SLCS as an operator and UTA as an owner, SLCS agreed 
that it would satisfy these duties and indemnify UTA for its failure to do so. UTA was 
therefore entitled to summary judgment.8 
Finally, SLCS argues that neither UTA nor SLCS is entitled to indemnification 
because there was no finding of liability. (SLCS Br. at 40). SLCS's indemnification 
obligation is a contractual duty that attaches irrespective of either party's negligence, or 
lack thereof. See kL; RUSS V. Woodside Homes. Inc.. 905 P.2d 901, 905-06 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1995). The fact that SLCS obtained a directed verdict and there was no finding of 
The Utah Legislature has stated that indemnification provisions between certain 
parties are against public policy and are void and unenforceable. See, e.g., Utah Code 
Ann. § 13-8-1(2) (stating that indemnification provisions in construction contracts are 
void and unenforceable). No such express provision is included with regard to the duties 
of railway companies, and SLCS does not argue otherwise. 
8
 SLCS also cites Section 7.1(b), which states that "[w]hen such Loss or Damage 
results from or arises in connection with the acts or omission of both parties . . . such 
liability shall be borne by the party or parties responsible under applicable law." (SLCS 
Br. at 38). This section would apply only if the Coordination Agreement provided that 
both SLCS and UTA were responsible for maintaining the Joint Trackage at the time in 
question. As explained above, SLCS - and only SLCS - had maintenance obligations for 
the Joint Trackage at the time in question. 
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liability in Goebel is therefore irrelevant to SLCS's indemnification obligations. The 
indemnification provision does not require a finding of fault - all that is required is that 
the loss or damage "arise[] in connection with" the performance or omission of SLCS's 
maintenance obligations, and it is undisputed that the Goebels claim satisfies this 
requirement. 
III. SLCS'S CLAIM FOR INDEMNIFICATION FROM UTA WAS PROPERLY 
DISMISSED. 
SLCS asks the Court to remand the case with instructions to enter judgment in 
favor of SLCS on its counterclaim for indemnification. (SLCS Br. at 42). SLCS is not, 
mder any scenario, entitled to indemnification from UTA. To find in favor of SLCS 
vould require the Court to ignore both the plain language of the Coordination Agreement 
s well as the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Goebel. Indeed, SLCS admits that if this 
"ourt follows the Supreme Court's decision in Goebel, SLCS is not entitled to 
idemnification from UTA. (See SLCS Br. at 39 ("If SLCSR and UTA both failed to 
>mply with the same law, neither is entitled to indemnity by the terms of.. . section [7.1 
'the agreement].")). 
As the Utah Supreme Court explained in Goebel, the statutes and ordinances 
plicable to SLCS required SLCS to maintain the crossings for the safety of Mr. Goebel. 
)4 UT f 16, 104 P.3d at 1191. SLCS has not, and cannot, point to any provision in the 
Drdination Agreement whereby UTA assumed SLCS's statutory duties to Mr. Goebel. 
>ent some contractual assignment by SLCS to UTA of SLCS's statutory duties - and 
39 
SLCS can identify none - SLCS is not entitled to indemnification. SLCS's counterclaim 
was properly dismissed. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court correctly held that SLCS assumed responsibility for the 
maintenance of the Joint Trackage and agreed to indemnify and hold harmless UTA for 
any loss or damage arising in connection with the performance or failure to perform these 
responsibilities. SLCS was required to maintain the Joint Trackage for the safety of the 
traveling public, including Mr. Goebel, both under statutory law and pursuant to the 
Coordination Agreement. Because the Goebels' claim arose in connection with an 
alleged failure to do so, SLCS was required to indemnify and hold harmless UTA. 
Accordingly, summary judgment was properly granted in favor of UTA, and SLCS's 
claims were properly dismissed. This Court should affirm the decision of the trial court. 
Respectfully submitted this 8th day of August 2005. 
Snell & Wilmer L.L.P. 
Todd M. Shaughnessy 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 8th day of August, 2005, two true and correct copies of 
the foregoing was placed in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the 
following: 
E. Scott Savage 
Casey K. McGarvey 
BERMAN & SAVAGE 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1250 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
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ADDENDUM 
A. Utah Code Ann. § 10-7-26(2); Utah Code Ann § 10-7-29; Utah Code Ann. 
§ 56-1-11, Salt Lake City Ordinance § 14.44.030. 
B. Ruling and Order, dated March 2, 2005. 
C. Judgment, dated March 10, 2005. 
D. Retained Freight Operating Easement 
E. Administration and Coordination Agreement 
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*** STATUTES CURRENT THROUGH THE 2005 FIRST SPECIAL SESSION *** 
*** ANNOTATIONS CURRENT THROUGH 2005 UT 12, 2005 UT APP 90 *** 
*** MARCH 1, 2005 (FEDERAL CASES) *** 
TITLE 10 UTAH MUNICIPAL CODE 
CHAPTER 7. MISCELLANEOUS POWERS OF CITIES AND TOWNS 
ARTICLE 7. LEVY OF SPECIAL TAXES BY CITIES AND TOWNS 
GO TO CODE ARCHIVE DIRECTORY FOR THIS JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Ann § 10-7-26 (2005) 
0-7-26 Streets and alleys used by railway compames 
) As used m this section and m Sections 10-7-27, 10-7-29, 10-7-30, 10-7-31, 10-7-32, and 10-7-33, the terms "rail-
company" or "street railway company" means any company which owns or operates railway tracks on, along or 
ss a street or alley in any city or town. 
(2) Nothing contained m this section or in the sections referred to in Subsection (1) shall be construed to exempt 
ailway company from keepmg every portion of every street and alley used by it and upon or across which tracks 
be constructed at or near the grade of such streets m good and safe condition for public travel, but it shall keep the 
planked, paved, macadamized or otherwise in such condition for public travel as the governing body of the city or 
may from time to time direct, keepmg the plank, pavement or other surface of the street or alley level with the top 
> rails of the track The portions of the streets or alleys to be so kept and maintained by all such railway companies 
include all the space between their different rails and tracks and also a space outside of the outer rail of each out-
rack of at least two feet in width, and the tracks herem referred to shall include not only the mam tracks but also all 
acks, crossings and turnouts constructed for the use of such railways. 
ORY: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 259; C.L. 1917, § 677; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 15-7-25; L. 1969, ch. 27, § 42. 
:s: 
S-REFERENCES -Municipal Improvement District Act, § 17A-3-301 et seq. 
S TO DECISIONS 
) in Goebel v Salt Lake City S R R Co, 2004 UT80, 509 Utah Adv Rep 39, 104 P 3d 1185 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
Copyright 2005 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. a member of the LexisNexis Group. 
All rights reserved. 
*** STATUTES CURRENT THROUGH THE 2005 FIRST SPECIAL SESSION *** 
*** ANNOTATIONS CURRENT THROUGH 2005 UT 12, 2005 UT APP 90 *** 
*** MARCH 1, 2005 (FEDERAL CASES) *** 
TITLE 10. UTAH MUNICIPAL CODE 
CHAPTER 7. MISCELLANEOUS POWERS OF CITIES AND TOWNS 
ARTICLE 7. LEVY OF SPECIAL TAXES BY CITIES AND TOWNS 
GO TO CODE ARCHIVE DIRECTORY FOR THIS JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-7-29 (2005) 
0-7-29. Railway companies to repave streets 
1 railway companies shall be required to pave or repave at their own cost all the space between their different rails 
bracks and also a space two feet wide outside of the outer rails of the outside tracks in any city or town, including all 
racks, crossings and turnouts used by such companies. Where two or more companies occupy the same street or 
with separate tracks each company shall be responsible for its proportion of the surface of the street or alley occu-
by all the parallel tracks as herein required. Such paving or repaving by such railway companies shall be done at 
ime time and shall be of the same material and character as the paving or repaving of the streets or alleys upon 
I the track or tracks are located, unless other material is specially ordered by the municipality. Such railway com-
s shall be required to keep that portion of the street which they are herein required to pave or repave in good and 
r repair, using for that purpose the same material as the street upon which the track or tracks are laid at the point of 
or such other material as the governing body of the city may require and order; and as streets are hereafter paved 
aved street railway companies shall be required to lay in the best approved manner a rail to be approved by the 
ling body of the city. The tracks of all railway companies when located upon the streets or avenues of a city or 
hall be kept in repair and safe in all respects for the use of the traveling public, and such companies shall be liable 
damages resulting by reason of neglect to keep such tracks in repair, or for obstructing the streets. For injuries to 
s or property arising from the failure of any such company to keep its tracks in proper repair and free from ob-
>ns such company shall be liable and the city or town shall be exempt from liability. The word "railway compa-
> used in this section shall be taken to mean and include any persons, companies, corporations or associations 
or operating any street or other railway in any city or town. 





on of franchise. 
O REPAIR STREETS. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-7-29 
Pagez 
Street railroad was not liable for injuries to person driving a horse-drawn cart which overturned when it ran upon a 
pile of stone left in the street by a party which had contracted with the city and the raikoad to build a crosswalk, in ab-
sence of evidence that the railway track was out of repak or that there was any obstruction upon it at the time of acci-
dent. Naylor v. Salt Lake City, 9 Utah 491, 35 P. 509 (1894), 
PROTEST AGAINST IMPROVEMENT. 
Raikoad company owning lots abutting on a street included within a proposed pavmg district had the right to file its 
protest to the proposed improvement the same as any other private owner of property fronting on the street. Cave v. 
Ogden City, 51 Utah 166, 169 P. 163 (1917). 
REVOCATION OF FRANCHISE. 
City could revoke a franchise and requke a raikoad to remove its tracks for refusal to abide by a covenant of the fran-
chise ordinance requking the track to conform to any changes in grade made by the city. Union Pac. R.R. v. Public Ser-
vice Comm., 103 Utah 186, 134 P.2d 469 (1943). 
CITED in Goebel v. Salt Lake City S R.R. Co., 2004 UT 80, 509 Utah Adv. Rep. 39, 104 P.3d 1185. 
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Copyright 2005 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. a member of the LexisNexis Group. 
All rights reserved. 
*** STATUTES CURRENT THROUGH THE 2005 FIRST SPECIAL SESSION *** 
*** ANNOTATIONS CURRENT THROUGH 2005 UT 12, 2005 UT APP 90 *** 
*** MARCH 1, 2005 (FEDERAL CASES) *** 
TITLE 56. RAILROADS 
CHAPTER!. GENERAL PROVISIONS 
GO TO CODE ARCHIVE DIRECTORY FOR THIS JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Ann. § 56-1-11 (2005) 
6-1-11. Maintenance of crossings 
ery railroad company shall be liable for damages caused by its neglect to make and maintain good and sufficient 
sings at points where any line of travel crosses its road. 
TORY: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 445; C.L. 1917, § 1237; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 77-0-11. 
ES: 
3S-REFERENCES. -Gates at crossings, § 10-8-83. 
ulation of crossings, § 10-8-34 et seq. 
>ping at crossings, duties of buses and certain trucks, § 41-6-97. 
IS TO DECISIONS 
,YSIS 
butory negligence. 
wed public by railroad. 
and sufficient crossing." 
actions. 
tions of law and fact. 
g-
fUBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
iff who was driving horse-drawn, covered milk wagon alongside railroad track in place of safety and without 
attempted to cross track in front of engine whereupon he was struck was negligent as a matter of law and was 
led to recovery for personal injuries on ground that defendant railroad could, by exercise of ordinary care, have 
i going into place of danger and prevented accident. Wilkinson v. Oregon Short Line R.R., 35 Utah 110, 99 P. 
*). 
W E D PUBLIC BY RAILROAD. 
iving his sheep along a public street through which a railroad ran was not trespasser, thus the railroad owed him 
t only to operate its train with due care after discovering the sheep on the track and in perilous situation, but 
e care in operation of its train in anticipation of dangers that might reasonably be expected to arise from the 
5 of the highway by the public. Smith v. San Pedro, LA. & S.L.R.R., 35 Utah 390, 100 P. 673 (1909). 
Utah Code Ann. § 56-1-11 
Fagez 
Under this section, a railroad has a duty to the traveling public to maintain good and sufficient crossings, and is liable 
for unsafe crossings regardless of materials used for its construction or maintenance. Van Wagoner v. Union Pac. R.R., 
112 Utah 189, 186P.2d293 (1947), opinion amended and rehearing denied, 112 Utah 218, 189 P.2d 701 (1948). 
This section imposes a duty upon a railroad to keep its crossings safe for the traveling public, but because negligence 
would be the basis of liability for breach of the duty, and notice of a dangerous condition is a fundamental component of 
negligence, the duty imposed by the statute does not give rise to liability in the absence of notice. Goebel v. Salt Lake 
City S. R.R. Co., 2004 UT80, 509 Utah Adv. Rep. 39, 104 P3d 1185. 
"GOOD AND SUFFICIENT CROSSING." 
- INSTRUCTIONS. 
Instruction that "good and sufficient crossing" is crossing that is sufficient and ordinarily safe for traveling public to 
pass to and fro over, keeping in mind its location, whether in sparsely settled or populous locality, and the character and 
volume of traffic that ordinarily may be expected to pass over it, was proper. Denkers v. Southern Pac. Co., 52 Utah 18, 
171 P 999 (1918). 
In wrongful-death action against railroad arising out of truck-train collision at crossing, instruction that crossing must 
be maintained to width equal to main-traveled portion of highway was substantially in accordance with this section, and 
refusal to instruct jury that railroad had duty to maintain crossing for width of sixteen feet was not error, especially 
where width of crossing had no causal connection with collision. Van Wagoner v. Union Pac. R.R., 112 Utah 189, 186 
P.2d293 (1947), opinion amended and rehearing denied, 112 Utah 218, 189 P2d 701 (1948). 
Failure to give requested instruction in words of city ordinance on duty to plank or pave crossing was not prejudicial 
error in wrongful-death action against railroad arising out of truck-train collision at crossing, where instruction on main-
tenance of crossing was given in words of this section, and was adequate to permit jury to find for plaintiffs if jurors 
believed from evidence that deceased was stalled because of improperly maintained crossing. Van Wagoner v. Union 
Pac. R.R., 112 Utah 189, 186P.2d293 (1947), opinion amended and rehearing denied, 112 Utah 218, 189 P.2d 701 
(1948). 
- QUESTIONS OF LAW AND FACT. 
There being no statute specifically defining a "good and sufficient" crossing, the question of whether a certain cross-
ing is good and sufficient is ordinarily one for jury to determine from evidence adduced, unless it clearly appears that 
only one conclusion can be reasonably drawn from evidence respecting condition of crossing, in which case it becomes 
question of law for court. Denkers v. Southern Pac. Co., 52 Utah 18, 171 P. 999 (1918). 
PLEADING. 
Complaint alleging that defendant railroad, knowing that sheep were on its track, negligently and carelessly ran, man-
aged, operated and controlled a train so as to strike the sheep stated a good cause of action. Smith v. San Pedro, L.A. & 
S.L.R.R., 35 Utah 390, WOP. 673 (1909). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
AM. JUR. 2D. -65 Am. Jur. 2d Railroads § 480 et seq. 
C.J.S. -74 C.J.S. Railroads § 472. 
A.L.R. —Indefiniteness of automobile speed regulations as affecting validity, 6 A.L.R.3d 1326. 
Contributory negligence of child injured while climbing over or through railroad train blocking crossing, 11 A.L.R. 3d 
1168. 
Governmental liability for failure to reduce vegetation obscuring view at railroad crossing or at street or highway in-
tersection, 22 A.L.RAth 624. 
Liability of railroad or other private landowner for vegetation obscuring view at railroad crossing, 66 A.L.RAth 885. 
14.44.010 
14,44.030 Grade crossings—Planking and 
paving. 
A. Every railway company operating within the 
boundaries of the city shall keep every portion of 
every city street or alley upon or across which their 
tracks shall be or are constructed and maintained in 
good and safe condition to accommodate public 
travel For this purpose, each railway company will 
install and maintain the materials required in the 
manner specified from time to time in writing by 
the mayor to surface and maintain the same in good 
condition for public travel. 
B. The portions of the street or alley surfaces to 
be so maintained by all such railway companies 
shall include all the space between their different 
rails and tracks and also the space outside the outer 
rail of each outside track for a distance of two feet, 
measured from the outside edge of the rail, for the 
full width of the.street or alley, including sidewalks, 
or length of said street or alley, unless otherwise 
directed by the mayor. 
C. At all times, the surface of the street or alley 
shall be maintained level with the top of the rails on 
the track. After being directed in writing to surface 
or perform maintenance work on an area of track-
age, each such railway company shall complete the 
work specified by the mayor within seven days on 
small roadway repairs or thirty days for major capi-
tal improvements, or such other reasonable time as 
specified by the city. Every railway company which 
fails or refuses to comply with such notice, within 
the time specified, shall pay to the city all costs and 
expenses incurred by the city or others at its direc-
tion for performing the required surfacing and/or 
maintenance work and the city may thereafter recov-
er such costs and expenses, including attorneys fees 
incidental thereto, in a civil action brought against 
such railway company in any court having jurisdic-
tion thereof. (Prior code § 35-1-5) 
14.44.040 Viaducts and bridges—Required 
when. 
Such railroads shall, when required by the mayor, 
construct suitable viaducts over all streets when life 
or property may be endangered by the ordinary 
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FUEL DISTRICT COORT 
Third Judicial District 
MAR 0 2 2005 
SALT LAKE G<5lJh 
By— J ru/^KTL_ 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
rJTAH TRANSIT AUTHORITY 
Plaintiff, 
vs, 
RULING and ORDER 
CASE NO. 030906885 
DATE: MARCH 2, 2005 
ALT LAKE CITY SOUTHERN RAILROAD 
O., INC., 
Defendant. 
The above matter came before the Court on oral argument on 
bruary 28, 2005, on the parties' cross-motions for summary 
dgment, pursuant to Rule 7. Plaintiff was present through Todd M. 
auhgnessy and defendant was present through E. Scott Savage. 
fendant filed its Motion for Summary Judgment, supported by 
lorandum on June 30, 2004. Meanwhile, Plaintiff filed its motion 
I supporting memorandum on August 12, 2004. Both Plaintiff and 
endant filed memoranda opposing the respective motions on 
tember 29, 2004. Both reply memoranda were filed on October 29, 
1. The court heard oral argument and took the matter under 
Lsement. Having considered the case file, the motions and the 
•randa submitted by the parties, and the arguments made in open 
t, the Court enters the following decision. 
BACKGROUND 
Plaintiff filed a complaint March 26, 2003. The complaint 
sought indemnification from defendant SLS. The complaint alleged 
that it settled a claim against Goebel who was injured while 
crossing a rail owned by plaintiff but that SLS had the duty of 
maintenance and repair. The claim is that in 1992 plaintiff 
acquired from Union Pacific (UP) a railroad right of way, but UP 
maintained a right of way for freight service and UP then assigned 
that right to freight service to SLS. On March 31, 1993, the 
parties entered into a Coordination Agreement, which is at the 
heart of this lawsuit. The complaint quotes various provisions of 
that agreement and relies on those to support its claims. In 
January, 1999, Goebel filed suit against both parties, as well as 
others, based on an accident at the intersection of 1700 South and 
approximately 200 West in Salt Lake City. Plaintiff notified 
defendant of the action and demanded indemnification and defendant 
denied its responsibility. In September, 2002, plaintiff settlec 
with Goebel. The complaint is in causes of action for (1J 
contractual indemnification, (2) implied indemnity, and (3) commo] 
law indemnity. 
On May 19, 2003, defendant filed an answer and counterclaim 
It denied the essential allegations, relied on provisions of tl~ 
-2-
Coordinating Agreement, and in the counterclaim asserted the same 
three causes of action maintaining plaintiff was required to 
indemnify defendant for its substantial costs in defending the 
lawsuit brought by Goebel. 
Goebel's complaint against these parties and others alleged 
Goebel was involved in a bicycle accident while crossing the tracks 
/hich resulted in serious and permanent injuries. It alleged 
gainst the manufacturer of the product used between the tracks 
arious products liability theories and negligence. As against 
laintiff herein, UTA, Goebel asserted a cause for negligence for 
ailing to properly maintain the intersection in a good and safe 
mdition for bicycle traffic. As to defendant herein that 
>mplaint alleged a possessory interest by defendant and the same 
use of action for negligence, a breach of the duty to properly 
intain the intersection in a good and safe condition for bicycle 
affic. A second amended complaint added a cause of action against 
L defendants and alleged the intersection was a nuisance as the 
;s and omissions of all defendants, including UP and Salt Lake 
y, rendered the intersection dangerous and a nuisance. 
These motions followed plaintiff's reply to the counterclaim. 
DISCUSSION 
The parties ask the Court to interpret, as a matter of law, 
whether a contract setting forth their mutual obligations to 
indemnify requires Plaintiff ("UTA"), or Defendant ("SLS"), to bear 
the responsibility for an injury which was claimed due to the 
allegedly negligent condition of a crossing owned by the Plaintiff 
and then in use by the Defendant, 
In 1993, UTA and SLS contracted for the use of UTA's right of 
way over property upon which rail trackage and road crossings are 
present. The agreement classifies the right of way property in 
three types, (1) Passenger trackage; (2) Freight trackage; and (3) 
Joint trackage, with UTA retaining the right to redesignate any 
trackage, UTA retained the right to exclusive use of the Passenger 
trackage, SLS was granted exclusive use of the Freight trackage at 
only certain times and on certain days, and SLS was granted the 
initial use of the Joint trackage, including the section of track 
crossing 1700 South at approximately 200 West in Salt Lake City, 
where the accident occurred. At all times relevant to the present 
action, the Joint trackage remained in SLS's control because SLS 
was using the tracks for freight, UTA was in the process of 
upgrading track for light rail at or about the time of the 
accident, though UTA had not altered the tracks at this crossing. 
The parties disagree completely who was in "control" of the tracks, 
SLS arguing with some persuasiveness that UTA owned the tracks anc 
had vast control over many aspects of the trackage. However, as o 
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the date of the accident in 1998 there was no passenger traffic 
along the rails of any kind and UTA had the sole and exclusive 
right to use the trackage for passenger traffic. SLS's right to 
use was coupled with its obligation to "at a minimum, maintain, 
repair, and renew the Joint trackage so as to preserve the present 
condition of track, grade crossings, and signal facilities[.]" 
Coordination Agreement at 3.1. While SLS was obliged to do so only 
to the standards it deem[ed] necessary for Freight Rail Service," 
he contract required that the maintenance be performed "in a good 
nd workman-like manner and in compliance with all applicable laws 
id regulations." Coordination Agreement at 3.3. 
On or about February 19, 1998, George Goebel was severely 
tjured when he fell from his bike at or near the crossing at 1700 
uth near 200 West. In January 1999 Mr. Goebel filed an action 
ainst both UTA and SLS, as well as others, to collect damages 
suiting from his injuries. While the theory of the precise 
strumentality which caused the accident perhaps changed over the 
irse of the litigation, Mr. Goebel consistently maintained that 
to these parties, UTA and SLS, it was the negligent state of the 
ssing which caused his injury and it was the failure of these 
ties to properly maintain the intersection. Ultimately, UTA 
:led with Mr. Goebel, but SLS did not. Factually, after trial 
>el suffered a directed verdict against him and defendant 
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herein, SLS, prevailed, as did Salt Lake City in that litigation. 
UTA now seeks, under language in the contract, indemnification 
for both the costs of the litigation and the amount of the 
settlement, SLS also seeks, under language in the contract, 
indemnification for amounts it expended related to the litigation 
in which it was successful. 
This contract, which defines the rights and duties of the 
parties in reference to each other, includes provisions designed to 
establish which of these two parties is liable to a third party 
injured due to the negligence of one or both of the parties. The 
Coordination Agreement requires of the party granted exclusive 
access to the right of way the maintenance of that right of way, 
which by definition includes xxall . . . crossings [.]" Id. Section 
1, definitions at page 5. In essence this agreement provides that 
the entity in control of a particular aspect of trackage was to be 
the entity responsible for maintaining it. Nothing in the 
Coordination Agreement reserves any duty of maintenance for Joint 
trackage crossings during the period of time at issue to UTA. UTA 
was not using the tracks in 1998 and SLS was. Granted SLS had 
limited use in terms of time and days, and UTA retained ownership 
as well as substantial control in other ways, but the burden of 
maintenance fell upon the party using the tracks under the 
agreement and according to the intent of the parties. 
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Section 3.3 of the Coordination Agreement, as cited above, 
identifies the duty of maintenance, and although it indicates that 
the duty requires nothing more than that SLS maintain the crossing 
at the condition which it deems necessary for freight rail service, 
and as it existed at the time of the execution of the contract 
(which was cited as being "good"), by allowing SLS to determine 
rhen maintenance is necessary, the duty contains a discretionary 
lement. It still requires maintenance. Axiomatically, then, SLS's 
xercise of discretion in maintaining, or neglecting, the 1700 
Duth crossing necessarily carried with it certain inherent risks. 
le parties' intent regarding the allocation of the burden of these 
.sks, or in other words, the allocation of liability, is addressed 
Section 7 of the contract: 
When such Loss or Damage results from or 
arises in connection with the maintenance, 
construction, operations or other acts or 
omissions of only one of the parties, 
regardless of any third party involvement, 
such Loss or Damage shall be borne by that 
party. 
at 7.2(a). In other words, nowhere in the agreement does UTA 
e itself a guarantor of SLS's exercise of discretion in the 
ner of maintenance or repair of the joint trackage during the 
Lod from the execution of the contract in 1993 to the time of 
accident in 1998. UTA did not retain an oversight function of 
responsibilities for maintenance. In fact, as the contract 
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further provides: 
Each party agrees that it will pay for all 
Loss or Damage the risk of which it has herein 
assumed, the judgment of any court to the 
contrary and otherwise applicable law 
regarding liability notwithstanding, and will 
forever indemnify, protect, defend and hold 
harmless the other party, its successors and 
assigns, from such payment. 
Id. , at 7.3. SLS does not contest that this language correctly 
reflects the intent of the parties on the matter of 
indemnification, indeed, SLS' argument in its motion requires it. 
Where the parties interpretations differ is upon the language in 
the contract regarding modification. 
However, the definition of modification used in the contract 
did not include alteration of the crossing. The limitations placed 
upon SLS's modification of the trackage included only "alterations 
or additions to, or removal of, then-existing trackage on the 
Right-of-Way," which the definition further clarifies as "including 
but not limited to new connections, and changes in railroad 
communication systems, signal or dispatching facilities." Even if 
remedying the alleged (by Goebel) negligent state of the crossinc 
required "modification," as with the maintenance duty, the 
provisions regarding the modification inject an element o 
discretion: 
-8-
If SLS reasonably determines that 
Modifications are required to accommodate its 
Freight Rail Service over the . . . Joint 
trackage, SLS shall bear all expenses in 
connection with such modification. 
Id. / at 4.1. While SLS was required to obtain UTA approval and 
enter into a separate modification agreement prior to commencing 
construction on the modifications, and thus UTA retained the 
.mplicit right to exert some control over modifications, the only 
ray in which UTA's duty would be triggered is if it denied SLS's 
equest to modify, or refused to negotiate with SLS regarding the 
odification. Not only were UTA's obligations related to 
edification not triggered by SLS's request to modify, the parties 
ive presented no evidence that UTA conducted itself in a manner 
ich would implicate this duty. 
CONCLUSION 
The Agreement, complex as it is, and even though it contains 
le ambiguities, seems to present an intent of the parties that 
user of the railroad, the tracks, is the one responsible for 
ntaining them. Reading the agreement as a whole, and 
lionizing all provisions where possible, the intent of the 
:ies is as stated in the preceeding sentence. The court 
eves, from an examination of the Goebel complaints, that his 
gations were a failure of maintenance in essence against these 
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parties. Because UTA's loss resulted from the maintenance, 
construction, operations or other acts or omissions of SLS, because 
the section of track where the accident occurred was within SLS's 
control at the time, the Coordination Agreement requires that SLS 
indemnify UTA for its payment of that obligation. 
The court does not agree that because both parties may have 
had, under the agreement, some obligation of maintenance at various 
times, that UTA is not entitled to indemnification. The agreement, 
at 7.3, discusses that the parties will pay for all loss for which 
it has assumed the risk. To the extent 3.3 of the Agreement is 
ambiguous, and the court believes it is not and is ruling that the 
language of the agreement dictates this result, if there is 
ambiguity other portions of the contract, as well as the course of 
conduct of the parties before, shows the intent of the parties 
throughout this period before passenger traffic existed. That 
intent was, again, that the user be responsible for the 
maintenance, and that included the crossings and included the duty 
of not only maintaining the rails so freight traffic would be safe, 
but so that at least the "present condition" would be maintainec 
and the tracks would be in a good condition in compliance "with al] 
applicable laws and regulations." Agreement at 3.3. 
The law requires, under this contract, indemnificatio 
regardless of the negligence of the other. 
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Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. 
Defendant's motion for summary judgment is DENIED, 
This Ruling and Order is the Order of the court and 
order is required-
DATED this L^_ day of/ L• LCJL'/ ^  4^2005 
71 
BRUCE C. LUBECK 
District Court Judge 
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Case No. 030906885 
Judge Bruce C. Lubeck 
JD16886318 
030906885 SALT LAKE CITY SOUTHERN RAILRO, 
This matter came before the Court, Honorable Bruce C. Lubeck presiding, on cross-
ns for summary judgment. The issues having been fully briefed, and the Court having 
d a Ruling and Order dated March 2, 2005, granting Plaintiff and Counterclaim Defendant 
Transit Authority's ("UTA's") motion for summary judgment, and denying Defendant and 
\SLC\340221 
Counterclaimant Salt Lake City Southern Railroad Company Inc.'s ("SLCS's") motion for 
summary judgment, and for good cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows: 
1. SLCS's Counterclaim against UTA is hereby dismissed with prejudice and on the 
merits, and SLCS shall take nothing thereby; 
2. UTA is hereby awarded a judgment of damages in the principal sum of 
$238,190.69, plus interest at the rate of rate often percent (10%) per annum, as provided by Utah 
Code Ann. § 15-1-1, for the period from September 19, 2002, through the date of entry of this 
Judgment; 
3. This Judgment shall bear interest from and after the date of entry at the rate 
specified in Utah Code Ann. § 15-l-4(3)(a); and 
4. Pursuant to the terms of Rule 54(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, UTA is 
hereby awarded its costs of court against SLCS. 
DATED t h i s / / , / ' day of March, 2005. 
BY THE COURT 
. i 
J^L- LS 
Honorable Bruce C. Lubeck 
Third District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM ONLY: 
BERMAN& SAVAGE 
E. Scott SafVage 
Casey K. McGarvey 
Attorneys for Defendant and Counterclaimant 
Salt Lake City Southern Railroad Company, Inc. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the of March 2005,1 caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing to be hand delivered to the following 
E. Scott Savage 
Casey K. McGarvey 
BERMAN & SAVAGE 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1250 
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TITLE. UPn« do*/ 
RETAINED FREIGHT OPERATING EASEMENT 
RETAINED FREIGHT OPERATING EASEMENT ("Freight Easement") 
retained by the Union Pacific Railroad Company, a Utah 
corporation (hereinafter referred to as "UP"). 
l. RESERVATION QF FREIQRT EASEMENT 
1.1 UP hereby reserves a rail freight easement for the 
purpose of providing common carrier rail freight service to all 
freight customers on the Right-Of-Way (as defined in Section 
1.1(a) of the Purchase and Sale Agreement between UP and Utah 
Transit Authority dated as of the 30th day of October, 1992). 
The real property to which this Freight Easement relates is 
described as: 
UP»s freight railroad line located between Ninth Street 
Junction, on the north side of NINTH (900) SOUTH 
STREET, Salt Lake City, Utah (approximately milepost 
798.74) and the Salt Lake County/Utah County boundary 
line (approximately milepost 775.19) consisting of 
approximately 23.55 miles, as shown on the UP's Chief 
Engineer fs Alignment Maps of the Union Pacific Provo 
Subdivision Line and as shown on the Oregon Shortline 
Railroad Station Maps - Lands aka Property Accounting 
Valuation Maps; 
UP's spur freight railroad line which departs in a 
southwesterly direction from the Provo Subdivision Line 
at approximately 6400 South in Murray, Utah 
(approximately milepost 790.52) crossing under both the 
1-15 freeway and the D&RGW Railroad main line, and then 
en 
cr; 
heading south to approximately 7400 South, to the point 
of intersection with the D&RGW right of way 
(approximately milepost 1,402), a distance of about 1.4 
miles, as shown on the UP's Chief Engineer's Alignment 
Maps of the Union Pacific Provo Subdivision Line and as 
shown on the Oregon Shortline Railroad Station Maps -
Lands aka Property Accounting Valuation Maps. 
That portion of the Property sold by Seller to UTA located 
in the center of historic Sandy (Old Town) which extends 
from approximately 8600 South to 9000 South along the UPRR 
Right-Of-Way and running from approximately 150 East to 190 
East; the east-west width of this property is approximately 
260 feet, more or less, with the exception of a small 
portion on the north end which is narrower, and its length 
from north to south is approximately 2560 feet; 
That portion of the Property sold by Seller to UTA situated 
between 5410 and 5830 South Streets at 300 West and which is 
approximately 2500 feet long and 125 feet wide; 
BUT LESS AND EXCEPTING THEREFROM THE PARCELS OF PROPERTY 
DESCRIBED IN EXHIBIT "A" HERETO AS TO WHICH NO FREIGHT 
EASEMENT IS RESERVED. 
1.2 This Freight Easement shall be for common carrier rail 
freight service on the Right-Of-Way and by this Freight Easement 
UP reserves the exclusive right to conduct freight railroad 
operations on the Right-Of-Way, but this Freight Easement shall 
not be construed to prohibit or limit other non-freight uses by 
other parties. Said easement includes the right to operate with 
UP's trains, locomotives, rail cars and rail equipment with UP's 
own crews over the Right-Of-Way for the purposes the set forth in 
this Freight Easement; provided, however, that said right to 
operate trains, locomotives, rail cars and rail equipment over 
the Right-Of-Way shall be an exclusive right to the occupancy and 
use of the Right-Of-Way only with respect to rail freight 
operations and UP acknowledges and agrees that Utah Transit 
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Authority (nUTAw) or its designee shall have the right to the 
occupancy and use of the Right-Of-Way for Passenger Operations 
and all other uses. 
1.3 The reservation of this Freight Easement by UP includes 
a reservation of any and all rights and obligations of UP under 
federal law to provide common carrier rail freight service to 
freight customers along the Right-Of-Way. 
1.4 The reservation of this Freight Easement includes 
reservation of a right of entry over the Right-Of-Way for any and 
all UP employees, agents or representatives, machinery, vehicles 
or equipment which UP reasonably may deem necessary or convenient 
for the purposes of inspecting the Right-Of-Way, clearing any 
derailments or wrecks of UP trains on the Right-Of-Way or 
otherwise conducting UP rail freight service over the Right-Of-
Way in accordance with this Freight Easement. 
1.5 This Freight Easement is subject to the terms, 
conditions and limitations set forth in the Purchase Agreement 
between UTA and UP. 
2. TERM AND TERMINATION 
This Freight Easement shall terminate and be extinguished 
and all real property rights and other rights reserved to UP 
lereunder shall vest in the owner of the Right-Of-Way in the 
ivent of termination, pursuant to an order of the Interstate 
rommerce Commission (I.C.C.), of common carrier rail freight 
ervice on the Right-Of-Way or any part thereof; provided, 
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however, that a termination of this Freight Easement pursuant to 
such an order shall apply only to those sections of the Right-Of-
Way subject to such I.C.C. order. The termination provisions of 
this Section 2 shall not apply to a termination of rail freight 
service by UP done as part of a transfer of its common carrier 
freight rights and obligations to a successor or assign. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have caused this 
Retained Freight Operating Easement to be executed as a sealed 
instrument by their duly authorized representatives as of the 
31st day of March, 1993. 
Attests / / 
X ' 





UTAH TRANSIT AUTHORITY: 
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY 
BY *?<%&/*„& 
(Print Name) 




STATE OF NEBRASKA 





On the day of March/ 1993, personally appeared before 
who being by me duly sworn did say, each for himself, that he, 
the said is the Assistant 
Secretary of Union Pacific Railroad Company, and that he, the * 
" ' " "
 is t h e jS^c 4S$r. 7^ *frc A. /f. s<z.s/ot<^T2. said __,__ 
of Union Pacific Railroad Company, and that the within and 
foregoing instrument was signed in behalf of said corporation by 
authority of a resolution of its Board of Directors and said 
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C c CO. $/hVLOC£ 
and /.. p. So/A^u^r 2~ each 
duly acknowledged to me that said corporation executed the same 
and that the seal affixed is the seal of 9^ id corporation. 
My Commission Expires; Xfck^t^ tyA^^^-^^C 
MJ$7 ^ NOTARY P U B L I C JEE«AlinTAHY-St2(»ff RUfHA HOWARD t Coram Eip. Nov. i 1091 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) SS: 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On the /TT day of 
before me Joan 
sworn did say, 
Burnside 
1993, personally appeared 
Burns ide find John C. Pingree who being by me duly 
each for herself /himself, that she, the said Joan 
is the President, and he, the said John C. Pingree is 
the General Manager of the Utah Transit Authority, and that the 
within and foregoing instrument was signed in behalf of Utah 
Transit Authority by authority of a resolution of its Board of 
Directors and said Joan Burnside and John C. Pingree each duly 
acknowledged to me that Utah Transit Authority executed the same 
and that the seal affixed is the seal/of Utah Transit Authority• 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
My Commission Expires 
r/";jst£80Sou?t2£3> I 
Sdi Late City, Utah 84101! 
AfyCommiuiDn Expires I 
o f t * * * 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
I S of « - f i - - J S : M - f c S K S r S S S T Suthea 
quarter of S e c t K r t i ( « ) . Township Two (2) South Range £ . ( 1 ) 
- \ West, Salt Lake Meridian, and more fully described as follows, tonrflt. 
^ 7 SrcenJer'oKatrse^lon. said 'point being fifty W««£?J£ 9 , 
^ aKM?(S&?«; K Ul-JS^S Sn^ h-sl^ -n, 
3 (0°30West. eight hundred sixty-two and s®vf^J^^n'J*f """ /f lqo30.\ M e s t oi 
H
 L 7 & North e1gbty-n1ne J^^fSExSTy?™™*~»"- — 
hundred (100) feet to ^ P ° ^ " ^ ^ ^ ^ l l r o S / t h e n c e North no 
line of main track £ j * « " J H ^ . t \ t s t two hundred thirty-three and 
S K ^ l S * S S d S w L r S s & f « to the place of beginning. 
A strip of land 100 feet wld,u 1;.theNortheast1/4 of Jectlon 1 3 . « . 
" • " • J ^ S r t F S w a ^ h e ^ o n ' s h o r t line Railroad Company. Sa,d st, 
C ^ g l r l T e r t l c u l U described as follows: 
Beginning at a point 1854 feet » ™ - • ' • » ^ l n ^ \ l i T ^ ^ l e l s . Soith of the Northeast corner of said Section i .
 5 0 f M t fn 
the East right of way line of the Oregon ?" "southwest corner of the 
the center line of Its main Une. and at the S°™wej£
 S o u t h 0"30' W. 
Serican Smelting and ™ « J * " m ^ ^ £ * U - E. along th. 
parallel to said center line ™>l.B™»'•^!%hence North 0"30E., para 
South side of John Berger's ^ • ^ - J / ^ e g o n Short Line main Une, 1< 




(Exhibit »A» continued) 
£)> rne following described lanrf /.ia,-_ ^ 
* * * of the Southeast Swrter 5 thi 2 ^ J ° "* t ; P a r t o f tot three (3) ,„w ^ 
^ , Beginning eight 5/10 (8 5/10) mrf* c ^ ^ "^<"an. 
though tSS SP^V* t h e l a n d iying b e t w e e n „, . 
*«» 49, and 62, sandy Sta t ion P l a t . i d i n g t r a t * s i t u a t e d i n 
cr. 
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ADHINISTEATION AND COORDINATION AGREEHEOT 
T M s ADMNISTRATION AND COORMNAriON AGREZHZNT
 ( t h 
" C o o r d i n a t i o n Agreement-, i s made a s o f
 tte 3 1 s t d a y ^ ^ 
1 9 9 3 , between S a l t Lake c i t y Southern R a i l e d Co , „ 
• '
 x n c
- , a Texas 
c o r p o r a t e f a s . , and
 D t a h ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
d - t r x c t organ ized under T i t l e X7A, c h a p t e r
 a . Par t 1 0 . Utah code 
A n n o t a t e d 1953 , as amended ("UTA"). 
WITNESSETH: 
WHEREAS, pursuant t o the Purchase and S a l - Acrreemen- K <• 
— Agreement between 
rnion P a c i f i c Railroad ComDany ("UDRR.M
 a T - ^ 
- 3 K u.wt j ana OTA, dated as o^ 
otober 30, 1992 (the "Purchase Agreement") j™,
 ha<? 
J/ U^KR bas conveyed to 
» as of the date of this Coordination Agreement certain ^ ight-of-
VI. trackage and other assets and improvements located on
 mst.m 
~vo subdivision Line, and on
 OTER.S
 L o v e n d a h, ^ ^ ^ ^ 
» «idvale Lead, (more fully described and defined belov as the 
ught-of-way.) excluding a freight railroad operating 
. operating easement 
ich was retained by DPRR; 
WHEREAS, pursuant to a freight railroad ooera-i™ 
operating easement and 
assignment agreement between DPRR and Sr s ria+. ^  
a
 S L S
' dated as of Karch 31, 
'3 (the "Easement Agreement"), DPRR h = <= ~ 
) , UPRR has conveyed to SLS as of the 
•e of this Coordination Agreement a fre^ob- ™n 
-ire^ gn^  railroad ooerating 
e a e n t
 °
n to
« Rigbt-of-Way (derinea b e l o v ' ej,QW a s
 the "Freight 
ement")
 i n o r d e r t o e n a b l e S L S ± 
^
 1 M
 common carrier rail i-ght operations on the Right-of-wavr 
WHEREAS, the parties hereto (DTA and SLS) will be sharing 
usage of the Right-of-Way under terms and conditions set forth 
below; and 
WHEREAS, the parties desire to clarify and establish their 
respective rights and obligations with respect to SLSfs common 
carrier rail freight operations on the Right-of-Way and DTAfs 
construction of additional trackage and provision of passenger 
seirvice on the Right-of-Way* 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises, 
reservations, covenants and undertakings contained herein, SLS and 
UTA covenant and agree as follows: 
SECTION 1. DEFINITIONS 
The following terms and phrases shall be defined as follows 
for the purposes of this Coordination Agreement: 
"Closing Date" shall have the meaning ascribed in the Purchase 
Agreement, which is the date the sale of assets from UPRR to DTA is 
closed and which closing is to take place, if practical by December 
31, 1992, but not later than June 1, 1993, 
"Coordination Agreement" shall mean this Administration and 
Coordination Agreement. 
UTA002C 
"Easement Agreement" shall mean that certain iv • „ 
c P « a t i n g easement „ d ttfi a s s i g i m e n t ~ « *«** ««*« 
<*** a n a « , M d d a t e d „ o f ^ 3 i_ ^ ' * « - b * ^ 
h e i g h t
 E a s e m e n t„ E h a i l M a n ^ ^ M s e m e n t ^ 
Common c;*r-T-T<*>- ~ --r ^ ~ - ^ c u . jjy v , !^ f o r 
on earner raxl frexght operation an the v±ah+ + 
to the terms af +h , *^at-of-Hay p i I r s u a n t 
«ie terms of the Easement Agreement. 
"Freight Preference Period" shall have the
 fflea -
Act ion 5.4 hereof. ^ ^ a S C r i b * d *" 
"Freight Hail Service" shall mean the common carrier -, 
he ight operations to he conducted by SLS on th 
7 S L S <a the Right-of-tfay. 
"Freight Trackage" shall mean any
 J o i n t ^ 
assenger Trackac „„ • . • Trackage and/or 
* r Trackage, vhxch xs designated by
 TO * f l „ 
-ekage pursuant to Section 2.3 hereof
 0 ^ ^ 
cistin^ * u ' r ^ Editions to the 







 « « » « * . to section 4. x hereof. ^ * t S r tta 
"Joint Trackage" shall mean the tracw„ . . . 
-Bay
 a s o f t h . „, .
 a C t a S e
 «
f
" ^ to the Hicht-
V as of the closing Date that was include • 
• — » * , «escrihed in B.hiMt *A» h e r e t " d e d " t h e * * * * * * 
l e s i „ a t * ' ™ i e S S SU<* Package i s 
l^gnated pursuant to Section
 a . 3 h e . e Q f 
— - d a n g e r Trackage . s i g ^
 b y ' J ^ ^ 
ckage pursuant- +•« c ^ . - b e J o u i t 
y« pursuant to Section 2.3 hereof. 
TTTAnnoi 
n msts l iabi l i t ies , judgments, 
-it chalT mean al l costs, ±J.<^~> 





p ^ l tte «i9ht-of-^, - — «"> 
"
a c r * : " " — « -— - * ^ -of"way"or 
• •„« rise to a claim for Loss or Damage-
omission giving rise x.o 
™mt" shall mean a written agreement 
"Modification Agreement shax 
^ i e s hereto entered into in anticipation of 
between the parties herer 
Modification. 
. , . . t a . o r -Hodifications" — 1 1 — » - l ^ t i o n S ° r 
"Modification or a Ricrixt-
. .
 t o or removal of, then-existing tradcage on the » , 
a d d l t l O M
 " '
 h t M t l i n i t e d to new connections, and changes 
o f . H a y , i n c l u d e hut not U» ^ ^ ^ 
in railroad cOBmuhicatxon systems, 
f a c i l i t i e s . 
. .^senger Preference — - " — " " ^ n i n 9 a S C r l W 
in Section 5.4 hereof. 
UTA0022 
- - — « . en
 a l I o r M y p o r t i o n o f ^ ^ ^ v M c h 
*e provxded by OTA or i t s designee. 
"Passenger Trackage" shall mean a l l «„ 
a i l segments of tracks ~a 
~ ^ ^
 h e r e a f t e r d e s i g n a t a d s y ^ t o h e ^ 
pursuant to Section 2.3 hereof. 
"Purchase Agreement" shall mean that
 CPrf9 • „. 
^
 c
^rtaxn Purchase and Sale 





 of October 30, 
"Riglat-of-Way« shall mean the f oliovina describe • • 
-
 a e s cribed portions of 
p r o p e r t y i u ^ t , c m v e y e d by W S R t Q ^ p _ ^ t ^ ^ 
-™ «- conation, o,
 tte ^ a s a A g r a e f f l a n t : a i i r i g h t . o f . f c 
•acicage,
 M d s t r u c t u r e s ^ ^ a d , a c e t f . t ^ 
J
^
c e n u
 ^ the Drooe^ty 
s = r l b e d i n P a r c e l s N o . , M d a o t " 
_
 A
 to the Purchase 
r e c e n t , including all
 r e a i p r o p e r t y . y s a o w n
 ^ d described in the 
?s and other documents regarding the riaht „-
M l l , , .
 rigiit-of-vay which were 
-luded xn Exhibit "A" to the Purchase * 
-rurcnase Agreement, and a l l 
*ures,
 t r a c k S / r a i l S / t i e s > 
r . ^ +. ' c r o s s ^ g s , tunnels, 




r u ctures, f a c i l i t i e s , 
«s ,
 s p u r S / turnouts, ta i l s , sidincs * M «. 
s s i n f T n ,_ .
 g S / t e a m
 tracks, signals, 
ssmg protection devices, railroad communication 
^icatxons systems, poles 
a l l other operating appurtenances that are sitna* „ , 
e
 sxtuated: (i) on or 
d . rt -„ the trackage formerly constituting P=* - " » " » " " 
" l i e from « - ^ " * * ~°*"™" " ^ " ^ ^ Subdivision Line ^ ^
 J a n c t i o n 
• 4-0iv UPRR milepos-t 775.xaj i i n u a e p r o r t - - - - <—> -*" •—in sait 
(which is on the *
 o n Q r 
lately UK» milepost 798.74}, an v 
s p u r , a l so Known ^ soatto,esterly direction at 
trackage referenced above ^ _ 
• , t e l v 6400 (SIXTY-FOCR EDNDE2D) South Stree 
approximately





 zrz - ~—- ——' -
/itnx/QCTPM mam line, ana. uxx 
(
 . .
 o f intersection with the DOS* right ox way, a 
South, to the point of inter 
distance of approximately 1-4 Biles. 
< i- LaXe City Southern Railroad Co., Inc . , 
»SU5" shall mean Salt LaXe Ci y 
„ the Freight Railroad Successor unaer the 
a Texas corporation and the Freig 
Purchase Agreement. 
u tah Transit Authority, a public t rans i t 
. O T X - shall meaa Utah Tr ^ 
• ^ under Title 17A, Chapter 2, Pa-w m, 
d i s t r i c t organized unde-
a n H i t s successors or assigns. Annotated 1953, and i ts su 
SECTION 2. 
. the terms « - conditions of the Easement 
2.1 w « « n t to the t e .
 o b l i c a t i o n to 
f S L S shall have the exclusive r ight and 
Agreement, SLS sn UTA002' 
provide Freight Rail Service on the Freight Trackage and the Joint 
Trackage. SLS shall have no right or obligation to conduct, and 
shall not conduct, directly or indirectly, Freight Rail Service on 
the Passenger Trackage or any other activity whatsoever on the 
Right-of-way that is not necessary to Freight Rail Service. UTA 
shall have no right or obligation to conduct, and shall not 
conduct, directly or indirectly, Freight Rail Service on the Right-
of-Way. 
2.2 UTA shall have the exclusive right to conduct, by 
itself or through UTA's designee or otherwise, Passenger Service on 
:he Right-of-way. SLS shall have no right or obligation to 
:onduct, and shall not conduct, directly or indirectly, Passenger 
ervice on the Right-of-Way; provided, however, that UTA and SLS 
ay arrange, under a separate written agreement, for SLS to perform 
ertain services on behalf of DTA with respect to the Passenger 
srvice. 
2.3 DTA may from time to time, upon 30 days written notice to 
^S, change any track designation (Freight Trackage, Passenger 
•ackage or Joint Trackage) to any other track designation; 
ovideo, however that no such change in track designation shall 
reasonably interfere with SLS's Freight Rail Service on the 
ght-of-Way; provided, further, that the parties may agree to 
mediate track redesignations to respond to emergencies or the 
eds of the parties. DTA may not designate trackage as Freight 
*ckage without the written consent of SLS if such trackage is (1) 
„ r ,21 then not being used 
„
 faT passenger Service, or (2) 
toen being used ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ e c o n o B i Cal ana 
tor Freight Bail Service. ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ . ^ 
* *,->- -pail Service ana r<=. 
r e liable Freight Bal ^ ^ c o o r d i nation Cc^ttee. The 
— ^ ^ ^ U i convene to resoive those administrative 
coordination « — ^
 f „ coordination committee 
« " coordination matt ^ ^ ^
 Agree,ent as veil -
r e g i o n by the ter^s ^  - ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
^
 other matters, upon agr ^ ^ ^ £ r o B each party. 
Committee shaU - = - - J£ S L S ^ OTA a l s o s haU be « 
The chief executive office. 
of the coordination Committee. 
officio members 01 
SECTION 3 . 
onsible for the maintenance, repair and 
- ^ " ^ r r t a n ^ t d e e . necessary for . e i g h t h 
r e n e « t h e same t o «*- M i n t a i n , r e p a i r 
. „ ^ vH^ -fc SLS shal l / at * *"-S e r v i c e ; provided that SIS ^
 p r - m e 
c o n d i t i o n of tracK * ^ ^ _ ^
 c o s t s and 
. e s c r i b e d on Z * » x t ^ ^ ^ , f ^ F r e i g h t 
e x p e n s e s of maintenance ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ „ 
— " ^ ^ . d r e n e . 1 on the . e i g h t Trackage in 
"JCT- - ~ — - UTA0026 
3-2 OTA shall be responsible for the maintenance, ^ ^ ^ 
renewal














— — a r y
 f o r P a s s e n g e , 
Service; DTA shall bear al l costs and expenses of • 
«penses of maintenance, 
repair and renewal of the Passenger Trackage. 
3.3 subject to sections 3.4 and
 1 0 . 2 , S L S s h a n he 
respons ive for and shall pay the costs of the maintenance, repair 
and renewal of the
 J o int Trackage a,d shall maintain, repair and 
renew the same to the standards i t deems necessarv * r- • 
necessary for Freicht Rail 
Service; provided that SLS shall, at a mini™1T„ 
• * - a minimum, maintain, reoair 
and renew the
 J o int Trackage so as to preserve the present 
condition of track, grade crossings and signal fac i l i t i e s as 
Ascribed on Exhibit -B- hereto.
 N o thing herein shall re i ievj SLS 
af the obligation to perform maintenance, reoair- *„,, 
«-e, repair and renewal on the 
Toint Trackage in a good and workman-like
 M n n o r , • 
XXK& m a n n e r
 and m compliance 
rith a l l applicable laws and regulations. 
3.4 Upon written notice to SLS at *™ *.• 
^ at any time, but at least 
"cty (60) days prior to commencement of
 P a « Q 
or Passenger Service, DT\ 
- 1 1 undertake and assume all costs of maintenance, reoair and 
— I of the Joint Trackage.
 D p o n assumption of m a i n ^ c e , 
: p a l r a n d
 «"«<«1 of the Joint Trackaoe nr» «„,•., • • 
s=, UTA shall maintain, 
P « r and renew the Joint Trackage to the standards i t deems 
cessary for Passenger Service; provided that OTA shall, at a 
nxmum, maintain, repair and renew the Joint TM=!„ 
""-""- Trackage so as to 
sserve the track to FHA Class I track an* 
.rack and grade crossings and 
signal facilities to their then « * - * condition. « . hereby 
l o d g e s that « - * — ' condition of track and signai 
^ i J L U s^ ic ient for its . e igh t . a i l Service. Xf « 
.„ ^ renew the Joint Trackage in 
*»ils to maintain, repair and 
„ with the s^dard set fort, above,
 W shall have the 
accordance with th ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
right to maintain, repair ana 
s t a n d i - e s s a r v to fulfill i f ~ i l carrier obligations. 
4 , I f S,S reasona.lv - a m i n e s that Modifications are 
* ^ its Freight Rail Service over the Freight 
reouired to accommodate its rreig 
„ ^ ^ts shall bear all expenses in 
«r- the Joint Trackage, SLS snaii 
repairing, inspecting, ana c ^ i c e 
^ associated with Passenger Service. 
a n y .creased o ^ g - ^ _ _ _ ^ _ _ 
e- c chall not commence caua<-~u 
SJJS snaii 1^ *- , Freight 
. . -•„„<= to the Joint Trackage or v.he txexy 
with such Modifications to tne 
• „ in to a Modification Agreement vita tTCA 
Trackage without entering xnto a M 
rnn».< written consent. The parties shall, tar -
and obtaining UTA's written 
• mmrnittee negotiate in good faith to enter 
the Coordination Committee, n 
*. *«T- qts's Modifications to tne 
a Modification Agreement for SLS 
or the Freicht Trackage necessary for Freigh 
^ ^ ^ H e over the Kight-of-way. Xll Modifications made by 
Passenger Service TTTAnfY? 
SLS to the Freight T r a ^ e or the
 J o i n t ^ ^ ^ . ^ ^ ^ 
of-Way shall become the property of OTA. 
4-2 OTA plans to construct additional trackage (which, in the 
absence of some other designation, shall initially he deemed to he 
Passenger Trackage) on the Right-of-Way
 s o that ^ 
2 ° ^nat, through usaae of 
existing and such additional trackacre ^ ,• , 
a g e
'
 t h e
 RJ-ght-of-Way
 may 
a c c o s t s Freight ^ n
 s a r v i c e ^ p a s s e n g e r sarvica_ ^ ^ ; 
— e the right to construct such additional trackage as
 i t d e a J 
necessary; provided, however, that no <™^ 
no such construction shaU 
unreasonably interfere with SLS's Freight ^ U s _ • 
yilt
 «an Service on the 
Right-of-way but that SLS shall reasonablv ,-„ 
asonably cooperate with OTA so as 
to allow for the construction of additional tracks ^ • 
"ZJ. trackage on the Riaht-
of-way. OTA and SLS, through the Coordination n • 
<^raination Committee, shaU 
cooperate to secure (from a third n„w-v • „ 
a third party independent contractor) 
temporary substitute service during c o n ^ ^ -
^xng cons auction or modification 
periods; the cost of substitute service to freiah* * 
t o rreignt customers during 
instruction or modification periods
 s h a U n o t . . 
—
L not:
 «« borne by SLS. 
TA shall be responsible for the cons*™,-. • 
« e construction of additional 
rackage for Passen'ger Service on the Pirrm- * 
the Right-of-ffay and shaU 
onstruct the same to the standards it deems
 n e 
aeems necessary for 
*ssenger Service; OTA shall bear all costs
 anrf 
cos^s and exoanses of 
instruction of such additional trackage. 
«-3 o a shall have the right, upon 30 days w i t t e n n o t i c e ^ 
3, to realign the Freight Trackage, the Passenger Trackage or the 
- * Trackage on the
 Right-of-Wav; provided, however, that no such 
rea l ignment s h a l l unreasonably i n t e r f e r e w i t , SLS-s f re ight Kail 
S e r v i c e but that: SIS s h a l l . reasonably cooperate with UTA so as to 
a l l o w for such realignment. 
A ^ ™ i n e s t h a t Hodif icat ions to the Joint 4 4 I f UTA determines w ^ 
fh« Passenger Trackage ( a f t e r construction) are Trackage or the Passeng _ 
^ d a t e <ts Passenger Serv ice over the Joint 
r e o u i r e d t o accommodate ^s 
+** Passenger Trackage, UTA s h a l l bear a l l expenses in Trackage or the Passenger x 
4^nrfcion of addi t iona l , be t tered , or al tered 
c o n n e c t i o n with construction or 
• -, AAM without l i m i t a t i o n t h e annual expense (for so f a c i l i t i e s , including without XJJU 
l o n g as such addit ional , bet tered, or a l t ered f a c i l i t i e s are a part 
o f t h e J o i n t Trackage or the Passenger Trackage) of maintaining, 
r e h i r i n g , inspect ing, and renewing such addi t ional or al tered 
f a c i l i t i e s . A l l addit ions, a l t era t ions and improvements made by 
.
 T f n t Trackage or the Passenger Trackage s h a l l become UTA t o t h e Jo int Trackage 
• the property of UTA. 
, A- „ o-niv (i) construction under Sect ion 4-2 and 4.3 4 5 Excluding only ( i ; -^w^*-1-
.ereof", ( i i , ordinary maintenance and r e p a i r work on the Joint 
Trackage ( i f UTA i s 'maintaining the Jo in t Trackage pursuant to 
S e c t i o n 3 .4) and ( i l l ) emergency work reguired for immediate 
r e a s o n s , UTA s h a l l notify SLS in writing of any proposed work on 
and sha l l submit plans on any Modifications 
t h e J o i n t Trackage and sha l l sue 
*H n*rties through the Coordination Committee, sha. t h e r e t o . The part ies , w - * 
• ««* ! fa i th to ensure that such Modifications do no . 
c o o o e r a t e m good fa i tn to 
™ s o n a b l y i n — ™ - i t * or inpeae n * ^ ^ « « v l « a ~ r 
w - o f - « a y . UTA0030 
SECTION 5 . QVMATIOES 
5.1 UTA shall have exclusive authority to „ 
« » * . «*•«*,
 to control ^ j • »u-a ^ 
locatives.
 r a i l c _ ^ r a a 
soeed of « , . e mov=ent and 
.—» of the «
 o n the Passenger Trackage, a s *h , , 
anv riri,f * shall not have 
any r.ght to operate on the Passenger
 T r a c J c a g ^ 
5.2 SLS shall have exclusive authority to m,n 
control all rai im^ „ • ***' d i r e c t ^ 
all raxlroad and railroad-related ooeraMon 
Trackage. SLS
 s h a n H °P«-xons on the Freight 
?e. SLS shall have exclusive authority to „ * 
« - X - i n s , W i , . railcars J ^ ™ 
~ ~ - speed of the « on the F r e i o h L l " ^ ~ 
» t have any right to operate on trac^ ^ 
•"ight Trackage. ^ ^ d S S i ™ -
>•> ^cept as set forth in Sections s.4-5 7 „, , . 
m o t i v e s , rail cars and rail ^ o f ^ £ < ~ -
— e d on the J o i n t Trackage without pre j u d i c a ' " " ' " 
- h a manner as
 v i l l r e s u , t i n T ^ ^ ^ 
fici.nt- a ° S t ^onomical and 
ficxent movement of all traffic. 
5.4 in order to ensure safe econn™; , 
" Service and * —omxcal and reliable Freight 
ervxce and Passenger Service, the
 M r f 
a
 F r e i q h . - „ ^
 P a r t i e s
 ^^eby establish 




-»ay between the 
hours of 12:00 midnight and 5:00 a.m., Monday through Friday, 
inclusive, and (ii) a Passenger Preference Period for the Right-of-
Way between the hours of 5:01 a.m. and 11:59 p.m., Monday through 
Friday, inclusive, and all Saturday and Sunday. SLS has inspected 
the Right -of-Way and reviewed the records of UPRR pertaining to 
Freight Rail Service on the Right-of-Way. Based on such 
investigation and review, SLS has determined that it can provide 
Freight Rail Service within the above Freight Preference Period.' 
SlaS agrees to employ such equipment and employees necessary to 
provide Freight Rail Service within the above Freight Preference 
Period. The Coordination Committee shall, at either party's 
request, meet to negotiate in good faith regarding proposed changes 
to the Freight Preference Period and the Passenger Preference 
Period. 
5.5 During the Freight Preference Period, DTA shall not be 
authorized to operate trains or conduct Passenger Service on the 
Joint Trackage or the Passenger Trackage, without special 
permission from the dispatcher. During the Passenger Preference 
Period, SLS shall not be authorized to operate trains or conduct 
Freight Rail Service on the Joint Trackage or the Freight Trackage, 
without special permission from the dispatcher. 
5.6 During the Freight Preference Period, SLS shall manage, 
direct and control, at SLSfs sole expense, all activities on the 
Joint Trackage. During such period, SLS shall manage, direct and 
control all freight railroad and freight railroad-related 
TTTAOm 
operat ions on the Joint T r i a g e and s h a l i
 d i r e c t « , 
c « * r o I t h . entry and e x i t „ ,
 a l l ^  , " " *
 d i
™«« «* 
, , , , . ,
 X t r a i n s / locomotives r a i 7 „ 
« - Z ^ i p « e n t and the
 n o v e m e n t ^ s p e e d J J - - » 
- ~ n t Trackage and the n , ^
 I r a c ] c a g e _ 
S . , Curing the Passenger P r e s e n c e
 P e r l o d , OTA 
* * *
 Trac*age. D u r i n g sucb ^ " ^ " / ^ " " " 
«-*»! - I act ive, on the Joint ^ ^ " " 
— c h i n g and controi the entry ^ ^ ^ ^ 
locomotives,
 r a i l c a r s a n , r a i i J ° «« *»!», 
~ «* - « on the Joint ^ a g e „ J ^ J ^ « 
-assenger Trackage. 
»-e S ^ shall pay ali ta.es, assessments
 f . „ „ 
c — - expenses reiated soieiy to
 F r a i c h t ^ ^ ' . ^ 
Right-of-Wav «,- ~ Service on the 
y ^  or way or ownership of the Freiah- -^  
HI taxes ^ cement. DTA shall pay 
•«• "caxes, assessments, fees, charges
 C a „ 
!
-lely






 *** expenses related 
hereof.





Tne parties shall negotiate in . , 
— — * . - • -roes, cost and a j j ^ " a l l 0 " t a 
— or shared
 Use of the H i g h t ^ 7 " " " ^ 
'thin? in this Secti - " ^ h°1'aVe-'' «»t 
thls section =.3 shall be construed to re™ • 
•y real »=-:..-» ., t o "quira SLS to 
estate or ad valorem taxes; provided furrh 
* " - — i o n 3.8 shall b e c o n s t r u e d t o ^ 7 * - - " — 
' «" — « « »*« taxes assessT ^ ^ " 
rty. assessed against the other 
UTA0033 
SECTION 6- Cii£AKi 
e l Xf by reason of any mechanical failure or for any other 
« , . not resulting fro. an accent or d e r a i l , « y *~in. 
!• rail car or rail eo^ipment of SLS becomes stalled or 
^ m o t i v e , rail car ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
— - proceed under ^ ^ ^ 
SDeed on the Right-of-Way or if, 
„,» set out of a SLS train on the Right 
otherwise defective cars are set on 
™ tall have the option to furnish motive power or 
of_„ay, then « ~ U ~ ^ ^ ^ o r ^ 
Such other assistance as^ay ^ _ ^ 
v^, ^ rain locomotive, car or e^u v such tram, x« . ^ ^irabursa 
disabled eouip-ent off the Right-of-Way, and SLS sha- -
' able and necessary cost of rendering any sucn 
UTA for the reasonable and n 
assistance. 
,.a I n the event of any derailment or ^  of a « . « ! . . 
tte Right-of-way of all obstructions within 
S L S shall dear « - ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ _ , i n g 
I acordLe with industry practices. Xn the event that 
or wreck, m acco^ ucu ^t-hin a 
S L S dees not clear the Right-of-Way of obstruct,^ -
reasonable time, « « * ~ the Right-of-Way o oos «ct 
™ . <=„,- an reasonable and necessary 
SLS shall reimburse OTA for al. 
incurred in performing such service. 
UTA003 





 P m i
- - » U o v e r t a k e
 t 
* " " " ' '—»i. -ft.
 M d X o c a l , °
 C O B p 1
^ « « . , u 
e i t t e r
 * » * *
 t 0
 « » P l y with s u c S l a « „ , " ^ f a i I U r e °* 
P—ity. c
 or charge ieing ass *
ay
 — if in any
 fina, 
r ^ , .
 p r 0 B p t l y M d i n ( J e m i i f y _ ^ ^ * - to c o n p l y a g r e e s ^ 
tte 0 t h e r P
= " y ^ such a ^ u n t . " *"** — * ° " > a r a i e s s 
J " 2 » ° f ~ t h s t a n d i n g ( i , „ 
«".«« „
 liaMlity b_d on ^J *»«u - rag^? 
« « - ^eto




" ' " * — the 
— „ i t h tta ^ ^ - - - U t ^ fcom ^ ^ 
- « -i-i™,
 at e i f c b e r p a r ^ ^ - ». " P o t i o n * o r o t h e r 
rties
 a s fol lows: ~ CTe a n d Paid by the 
connection
 v i t h tte B a i n t — or a r i s e s in 
— acts or o n i o n s c , o n l y in ^ ° — -
-
1
- wnxy one o"^  thA 
« any
 ttira p a r t y ^ ^ ^ " P « l « . regard less 
borne by
 ttat p a r t y . ^ '
 C L o s s
 °r Daaaje
 s h a l a b f i 
UTA0035 
(b) When such Loss or Damage results from or arises in 
connection with the acts or omissions of both parties, or of 
third parties, or from unknown causes, Acts of God, or any 
other cause whatsoever, such liability shall be borne by the 
party or parties responsible under applicable lav. 
7,3 Each party agrees that it will pay for all Loss or Damage 
the risk of which it has herein assumed, the judgment of any court 
to the contrary and otherwise applicable law regarding liability 
notwithstanding, and will forever indemnify, protect, defend and 
hold harmless the other party, its successors and assigns, from 
such payment. 
7*4 In the event that both parties hereto shall be liable 
under this Coordination Agreement for any claim, demand, suit or 
cause of action, and the same shall be compromised and settled by 
voluntary payment of money or valuable consideration by one of the 
parties, release from liability will be taken in the name of both 
parties and all of each partyfs officers, agents, and employees-
Neither party shall *make any such compromise or settlement in 
BX.C^SS of $25,000 without prior, written authority of the other 
party having liability, which consent shall not be unreasonably 
withheld, but any settlement made by one party in consideration of 
$25,000 or less shall be a settlement releasing all liability of 
both parties and shall be binding upon both parties. 
UTA003 
7-5 m case a lawsuit or lawsuits shan ^ 
C c c ^ a t i o n A g r „ , ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ m s 
Vrt, ^ s l y m l t U a n o t i c e * » " *» - *>» ^ 
•u * -
 o r DaMge in accordance ««* - — * -
- -««-
 a n d s h a l l b a v e h a d r e ^ a
 y
 " " ^ - - " —
 b a a n 
**> * « - « - .
 tta acj nti ~ t y - —• -
, «o r d e d , ^ p a r t y s o n o t i f i e d * . ~ ~ h a s i a e i J 
udgttent. 9 " - * e n t be bound by such 
7
- 6 Nothing in , this Section 7 shall >, 
OTA of anv * • construed as a waiver 
°
f a n y
 "««ni ty # pursuant to T*tl- fi- ^ 
motated 195-, *" ^ ^ ^ r 30, Utah Code 
1353, as amended, or a p p l i e d so as to , - • 
n s t i t u t e such waiver. e frec txve ly 
UTA0037 
SECTION 8 . TERM; TERMINATION 
8 . 1 T h i s Coord ina t ion Agreement s h a l l t e r m i n a t e upon t h e 
t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e F r e i g h t Easement . 
8-2 Te rmina t ion of t h i s C o o r d i n a t i o n Agreement s h a l l n o t 
r e l i e v e e i t h e r p a r t y of t h e i r o b l i g a t i o n s o r l i a b i l i t i e s t o t h e 
o t h e r p a r t y a r i s i n g p r i o r t o such t e r m i n a t i o n . 
SECTION 9 . COMPLIANCE KITH LAWS 
UTA and SLS s h a l l comply w i t h t h e p r o v i s i o n s of a l l a p p l i c a b l e 
l a v s , r e g u l a t i o n s , and r u l e s r e s p e c t i n g t h e o p e r a t i o n , c o n d i t i o n , 
i n s p e c t i o n , and s a f e t y of t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e t r a i n s , l o c o m o t i v e s , 
c a r s and o t h e r equipment o p e r a t e d over t h e R i g h t - o f - w a y . Each 
p a r t y s h a l l indemnify, p r o t e c t , defend and h o l d h a r m l e s s t h e o t h e r , 
i t s a f f i l i a t e s , and any of i t s d i r e c t o r s , o f f i c e r s , a g e n t s and 
e m p l o y e e s from and a g a i n s t a l l f i n e s , p e n a l t i e s , and l i a b i l i t i e s 
i m p o s e d upon t h e o t h e r p a r t y , i t s a f f i l i a t e s o r any of i t s 
d i r e c t o r s , o f f i c e r s , a g e n t s , or employees u n d e r such l a w s , r u l e s 
a n d r e g u l a t i o n s by any p u b l i c a u t h o r i t y o r c o u r t h a v i n g 
j u r i s d i c t i o n , when a t t r i b u t a b l e t o i t s f a i l u r e t o comply w i t h t h e 
p r o v i s i o n s of t h i s s e c t i o n -
UTA003 
SECTION 1 0 . CASUALTY T ^ f c 
10.1 In the event that any portion of the Rich^ , 
,-_
 K .
 u a e
 -^gnt-af-Way that 
« be l n g used b y ^ £ o r ^ c o n t i n u £ d p ^ v i ^ 
Service is damaged or destroyed by
 f I o o d t l M . . ^ ^ 
« » . pcrt.cn ex the Mght-of-Kay so damaged or d - " 
• « ^ « " — c - i t i - as existed pr7or t ^ 
- - t r ac t i on , or




 l i ] c e ^ ^ ^ - - » 
-pense or such repair or replacement shall"
 b h " * * " * 
snail be borne by DTA. 
10.2 x„ the event that any portion or the Hight-of-Hay tha^ 
-
 b e i n g used b y S L S f o r tte c o n f c i n V tha. 
S e r v i „ ^ Provision of freight Hail 
S « v i c # and «hich is not also being used for » . , 
y ^ea ror Passenger Service i<s 
=-aged or destroyed by flood,
 f i r e , c i v i l * " * " ' " 
• - r t ^ . *_
 ais
«-urbance, earthouaJce 
• - » . sabotage or act of Cod, or accidents or vandal* 
Mrd parties or for which th *««»aU« caused by 
^ -Loir ^nicn the cause i<?
 T7r,^ 
ither rii U n t a o w n ' then, SLS may 
^her (i,
 r e p a i r / o r c a u s e t Q ^ 
icrhi--o^ « " fc Po r^°n of the 
tght-of-way so damaged or destroved to
 s u b ^ . -
3 n d l > . * °
 s u bstantiai iy the same 
-d i t ion as existed prior to such damaee o. destruc^. 
'P^ce, or cause to be replaced, such
 D Q r t . • 
Jce kind . - • P°r t l o n with property of 
kind, condition or quality.
 T n e C O s t : 
M , - -
 a n d
 expense of such 
Pair or replacement shall be borne by SLS- • 
' »ts, provided, oovever. 
„ n not be obligated under this Section 10.2 to repair 
that SLS shall not fie ODX+V 
o r reolace the daaaged or decoyed portion of the *ight-of-Hay if 
! » « « ' . good faith jud^nt the cost thereof would he excessive or 
_e.sona.le ta*ing into account the profitability of « - . freight 
operations on the Hight-of-Way, unless ^ shall agree to remorse 
SLS for such cost. 
l 0 3 Except when suhjeot to Section 7, in the event any 
portion of the Kight-of-Way is damaged or destroyed hy accidents 
..v, r^w-v or vandalism by the employees or agents of 
caused by either party or vana 
H the party that caused the accident or whose 
either party, and the parry 
„ p n t s caUSed the vandalism shall bear the cost and 
employees or agents causea tu 
expense thereof. 
SECTION 11. COMPENSATE 
11.1 Except as otherwise specifically provided in this 
a n t S Ic and UTA shall have no obligation to pay Coordination Agreement, SLS ana 
«*r-h other in connection with this 
or otherwise compensate each othe. 
Coordination Agreement-
*<,**<> navabTe by SLS or OTA under this 11.2 Any payments due and payas.e cy 
+ «h*ll be paid within forty-five (45) days 
Coordination Agreement shall be pax 
int of an invoice therefor, by chec* delivered to the 
after receipt of an inv«j. 
- the oavee as set forth in Section 13.4 hereof; provided, 
address of the payee as * 
„ , . that in the event of a good faith dispute relating to any 
however, tnaL -m ^ ^ 
„t the dieted portion of the invoice shall be paxd, 
such parent, the . U T A 0 0 4 
with full reservation of rights to possible reimbursement
 U D Q n 
resolution of such dispute. Any payments
 n o t ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
(45, days of an invoice therefor shall thereafter be subject to 
merest charges, which shall accrue at the highest lawful rate for 
the forbearance of money. 
11.3 upon request, a party disputing the accuracy of an, 
invoice shall be entitled to receive fro* the billing
 p a r t y mi„ 
of such supporting documentation and/or records as are tat in the 
canary course of the billing party-s business and which are 
reasonably necessary to verify the accuracy of the invoice as 
rendered. 
SECTION 12. INSURANCE 
SLS, at its sole cost and expense shall ™ 
f «»«/ snail procure or cause to 
ae procured and maintain or cause to h« * • ^  . 
cause to be maintained during the 
:cntinuance of this Coordination Agreement, railroad ooerating and 
•rahility insurance covering liability assumed by SLS under this 
oordination Agreement with a limit of not less than Twenty-?ive 
xllion Dollars
 (52s,000,000, combined single li.it f o r personal 
^ury and property damage per occurrence, with deductible or self 
— n e e not greater than rifty
 T h o u s a n d ^ ^ ^ . ^ _ 
-S shall furnish to OTA certificates of s^urar,,-- • • • 
"•. -nsurance eviaencmg the 
rave coverage in the form of a policv far „„i ,• • 
poncy (or policies) at the time of 
:ecution of this Coordination Agreement. such insurance shall 
ntam a contractual liability endorsement which will cover the 
™~A under this Coordination Agreement and an 
obligations assumed under ui 
*
 mir,fl UTA as -additional insured." In addition, such endorsement naming UTA as 
.
 all contain notification provisions whereby the insurance shall conta-m 
™,nv aorees to give thirty (30) days' written notice insurance company agrees v. ? 
. a n „ £„ 0r cancellation of the policy. All of 
-to the UTA of any change xn or 
- ,nH notice provisions shall be stated on the these endorsements and notice p^ 
„,-« which is to be provided to UTA. certificate of insurance whicn is t
 e 
SECTION 13. Gmm^mm^s 
13.! This Coordination Agreement and the agreements 
referenced herein constitute the entire agreement between the 
parties hereto with respect to the subject matter contained herein 
and there are no agreements, understandings, restrictions, 
warranties or representations between the parties other than those 
set forth or provided for herein. All Exhibits attached hereto are 
hereby incorporated by reference into, and made part of, this 
Coordination Agreement. 
13.2 This coordination Agreement may not be amended except by 
an instrument in writing signed by the parties'hereto. 
,3 3 waiver of any provision of this Coordination Agreement, 
in whole or in part, can be made only by an agreement in writing 
signed by the parties and such vaiver in any one instance shall not 
^
 anv other provision in the same instance, 
constitute a w~ver of any otb WUML 
nor any waiver of the same provision in another instance h . 
. . - instance, but each 
provision shall continue in full force and effect with 
ej-iect with resDect to 
any other then existing or subsequent breach. 
13.4 A notice or demand to be civen h v „„ 
K , , ,.
 Y
 °
n e P a r t y to the othe>-
shall be given in writing by personal service
 t e l . 
w .,
 lce
' telegram, express 
*ail, federal Express,
 D HL or any other similar form Qf ^ ^ ^ 
delivery service, or mailing in the United states mail, postal 
prepaid, certified, return receiot revested
 ar,d „,, 
*
 S c e d
 ^
d
 addressed to such 
party as follows: 
(a) in to. c*sa «* . » o t i c s o r c o m m m l c a t i o n t Q t h £ ^ 
i t t e n t l m : General





 salt ^  city, ^ 
S4130-0810, vita
 a c o p y t o . ^ D_ 
u s w a i
« . Attorney for tha 
(b, in th. case of . notice « c o ™ ^ ^ to
 S L S £ d d r e s s a d 
to the principal office of SLS, Attention- r 
'
 A t t e n t a o n
- General Manager, Carl 
Hollowell, P. o. Box 57366, Murray, or 84157 with 
1 3 /
'
 w x tk a copy to the 
p-- l d a n t o f R a i l I e x s e r v i c e s > l n c _ ; < o 4 o B r M d v a y _ ^ a a ^ 
— . x,
 7S209 or a d d r e s s e d ^ such o t h e r ^^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
« « « party as ttat pa« y *ay. f r o m t i a e t Q ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
- x t « g dispone* a.
 p r o v i d e d ta ^ Section_ w i ^ 
demands, requests, and other communication. , „ 
,
 ln ^^icauions under this Agreement 
>nall be m writing and shall be deemed
 D r C n . H 
ea Pr°Pe^ly served and to have 
'
een d u l y <3i™* d) on the date of
 d * n „ 
of delivery, if delivered 
personally on the party to whom notice is „<„ 
e
 is given,
 o r if m ade by 
elecopy directed to the party to whom notice is to H • I v . i C e l s
 to be given at the V A X U 
t e l ecopy number l i s ted below, or ( i i ) an r e c e i p t , i f mailed to the 
p a r t y to whom notice i s to be given by r e g i s t e r e d or ce r t i f i ed 
ma i l , re turn receipt requested, postage prepaid and properly 
addressed* 
13-5 If any provision of t h i s Coordination Agreement sha l l be 
he ld or be deemed to be or s h a l l , in f a c t , be i l l e g a l , inval id, 
i nope ra t i ve or unenforceable as applied i n any pa r t i cu l a r case in 
any j u r i s d i c t i o n or ju r i sd ic t ions or in a l l j u r i s d i c t i o n s or in a l l 
ca ses because i t conflicts with any o ther provis ion or provisions 
hereof or any constitution or s t a t u t e or r u l e of law or public 
p o l i c y , or for amy other reason, such circums^cances shal l not have 
t h e e f f ec t of rendering the provision in quest ion inoperative or 
unenforceable in any other case or circumstance or of rendering any 
o t h e r provision or provisions herein contained i l l e g a l , inval id , 
i n o p e r a t i v e , or unenforceable to any ex ten t whatever. The 
i n v a l i d i t y of any one or more phrases , sentences , clauses or 
s e c t i o n s of th i s Coordination Agreement s h a l l not affect the 
remaining portions of th i s Coordination Agreement or any par t 
t h e r e o f . 
13-6 This Coordination Agreement: ( i ) contains headings only 
for convenience, which headings do not form p a r t of and sha l l not 
be used in construction; and ( i i ) i s not intended to inure to the 
b e n e f i t of any person or ent i ty not a p a r t y . 
UTA0044 
13.7 All of the tara and previsions of this Coordination 
Agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of, and be 
enforceable by, the parties hereto and their respective successors 
- d permitted assigns, ^cept to a corporate parent, subsidiary or 
ether affiiiate, SLS aay not assign its rights or obligations under 
this Coordination Agreement-
m 
1 3 . 8 This Coordination Agreement may be executed 
c o u n t e r p a r t s , each of which s h a l l be c o n s i d e r e d an o r i g i n a l , but 
» 1 1 o f which together s h a l l c o n s t i t u t e but one and t h e same 
i n s t r u m e n t . 
1 3 . 9 T h i s C o o r d i n a t i o n Agreement s h * n >, 
y - aenu s n a i l be gove rned by and 
c o n s t r u e d u n d e r t h e laws of t h e S t a t e of Utah i ^ i ,, • 
wt unan , i n c l u d i n g c o n f l i c t 
o f l a w s p r i n c i p l e s . 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, t h e p a r t i e s h e - P - n >, 
* - u x e s n e r e u o h a v e caused t h i s 
C o o r d i n a t i o n Agreement t o be e x e c u t e d a s a s « i ^ * * 
2 5 a
 s e a l e d i n s t r u m e n t a s of 
t h e d a t e f i r s t s e t f o r t h above by t h e i r - * „ i u • 
"I T^ieir d u l y a u t h o r i z e d 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . 
WITNESS: 
SALT LAKE CITY SOUTHERN 
RAILROAD CO., INC. 
3
^ /£/'.. Ztt4i?^: 
T i t l e : i .-T~> 
UTA0045 
J/29/93 Coordin.Ag7 27 
WITNESS: UTAH TRANSIT AUTHORITY 
By: 
Ti t le '.yd^ci^^ -?77^4^L. 
UTA0046 
EXHIBIT "A" 
DESCRIPTION OF TRACKAGE SUBJECT TO SLS'S FREIGHT EASEMENT 
HP's freight railroad line located between Ninth Street 
Junction, on the north side of NINTH (900) SOUTH STREET, 
Salt Lake City, Utah (approximately milepost 798*74) and 
the Salt Lake County/Utah County boundary line 
(approximately milepost 775.19) consisting of 
approximately 23.55 miles, as shown on the UP's Chief 
Engineer's Alignment Maps of the Union Pacific Provo 
Subdivision Line and as shown on the Oregon Shortline 
Railroad Station Maps - Lands aka Property Accounting 
Valuation Maps; 
UP's spur freight railroad line which departs in a 
southwesterly direction from the Provo Subdivision Line 
at approximately 6400 South in Murray, Utah 
(approximately milepost 790.52) crossing under both the 
1-15 freeway and the DSRGW Railroad main line, and then 
heading south to approximately 7400 South, to the point 
of intersection with the D&RGW right of way 
(approximately milepost 1.402), a distance of about 1.4 
miles, as shown on the UP's Chief Engineer's Aliqnment 
Maps of the Union Pacific Provo Subdivision Line and as 
shown on the Oregon Shortline Railroad Station Maps -
Lands aka Property Accounting Valuation Maps; 
The trackage on that portion of the Property sold bv Seller to 
UTA located in the center of historic Sandy (Old Town) which 
extends from approximately 8 600 South to 9000 South along the 
UTPRR Right-Of-Way and running from approximately 150 East to 
190 East; the east-west width of this property is 
approximately 260 feet, more or less, with the exception of a 
small portion on the north end which is narrower", and its 
length from north to south is approximately 2560 feet; 
The trackage on that portion of the Property sold by Seller to 
UTA situated between 5410 and 5830 South Streets at 300 Wesr 
and which is approximately 2500 feet long and 125 feet wide. 
BUT LESS AND EXCEPTING THEREFROM TEE FOLLOWING DESCRIBED 
PARCELS OF PROPERTY WHICH ARE NOT INCLUDED IN OR SUBJECT TO 
THE FREIGHT RAILROAD OPERATING EASEMENT: 
SEE THE DESCRIPTIONS ON THE FOLLOWING PAGES 
UTA0047 
(Exhibic "A" coacinued) 
A piece of land one hundred (100) fest wide, situate in the Southwest 
auSrter of the Northeast quarter, and the Northwest quarter of the Southeast 
? £ 3 £ of Action Thirteen (13), Township Two (2) South Range One,(1) 
West, Salt Lake Meridian, and more fully described as follows, to-wic: 
Beginning at a point on the East and West center l ine of said Section 
Thirteen (13) seven hundred forty-nine and one tenth 749.1) feet Ease rrom 
the c S ? e r of said section, said point being f i f ty (50) feet East along said 
c ^ t l r l i n e of said section from where i t i s intersected by the center l ine 
S ? 2 * rlit JraS of the Oregon Short Line Railroad; thence North no degress 
f ^ ^ " J S S s fO*30M East on a l ine parallel with said canter l ine or 
and th ir ty f " ^ ^ 0 ^ V f ^ f d1^tant therefrom at right angles, six 
d e a r S s aid f i f ty minutes (81-50')East, one hundred one and fifteen degress ano r i r t y » v deoress and thirty annutes 
^ ^ l C ? J ^ hundred s i S ? t w o and seventy-three hundredths (862.73) 
i Q l Q ) ^ ^ H t ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ and thirty minutes (89"30«) West one 
f e e t ; thence North f 1 ^ ^ ™ e „ 2 * /en)
 feJ3+- Easterly from aforesaid center 
UnTTf m a W S o? * 5 ° r e g o ^ o ^ L i n T R a n S a " ^thence North no 
d w r ^ s S d thirty Smrttt ( o V ) East two hundred tin rty-thrse and 
s l e i g h t hundredths (233.58) feet to the place or beginning. 
A . t r i p of land 100 « ^ ^ t t f ^ ^ o ^ i S ^ £ * ? \ 
^ V H ^ O T S ^ ^ S ^ S ' s t o r t - L l S Railroad Company. Said strip 
ge^n^^orllarticuTarly fe lcnbld as follows: 
Beginning at a point 1854.feet more or less West and 311 feet aore.or ^ 
l e s s South of f / " ^ ^ S Sregofsnort t ine S i S a d SO feet from 
S e ^ F ? ? \ n / ? t s Iain line and at the Southwest comer of the 
the center l ine of ^ " ^ i V " r ^ n v ' s nrooertv thence South 0°30' W., 
American Smelting and Retning Company s property. £ « « ^ 
paral le l to said center 1 ne 1691.£ ™ - - ^ « ^ N a r t n
 u] 
South s ide of ^ B e r , e r - s ^ ; 0 1 ^ ^ f ^ ^
 min l i n e , 1687. 
Y J P * £ £ $ ^ ^ ^ * feet to the place of beginning. 
UTA0048 
(Exhibit "A"'' ccmclnueji) 
The following described land claim, to wit; Part of Lot thre* (3) and nar* 
of the Southeast quarter of the farthest quarter of Section Six (6) in " 
Township Three (3) South, of Range One (1) East, Salt Lake Meridian! 
Beginning eight 5/10 (8 5/10) rods East from the Northwest corner of said 
lo t three; thence East nineteen40/100 reds; thence South one hundred and 
sixty (150) rods; thence West nineteen 40/100 rods; thence West one hundre-
and sixty (150) rods to the place of beginning. 
Less and excepting the follovn-ng parcels of prooertv «h-r<->,
 3r-n «„ i • ., • -
Che Retained Freighc Operating ZasLeac: P ^ P ^ y , vaicn
 a r e included vxcs: 
1- That portion within the bounds at the ex i s t ine s ine l e 
-
: L n e
 through t rack which i s a g n r c r ^ t a i y 65 feet in width." 
2 . That porticn of the land -lying betwesa the sincie Lin-
irrough t r a d e and 14 feet East and abutt ing the canter l ine c^ i e
 Eas t e r l y most track of the exis t ing s iding t rack s i tua ted" in 
•eta 40, 49, and 62, Sandy Sta t ion P la t . 
UTA0049 
EXHIBIT "B" 
DESCRIPTION OF PRESENT CONDITION OF TRACK, GRADE CROSSINGS 
AND SIGNAL FACILITIES REGARDING THE PROPERTY AS OF CLOSING 
TRACK: 
The entirety of the main track rails on the Property are 133 pound 
rails (133 pounds per yard) and are in good condition. 
The main track on the Property between the Salt Lake County/Utah 
County boundary line and north of the north end of Pallas Yard, at 
approximately 5330 South, Murray, Utah is FRA Class III because of 
the condition of the railroad ties. 
The main track between approximately 5330 South, Murray, Utah, and 
Ninth Street Junction, approximately 3 00 feet north of the norrh 
side of 900 South Street in Salt Lake City, Utah is generally FRA 
Class III but with several areas that are only FRA Class II because 
of the condition of railroad ties and occasional insufficient 
cross levelling. 
All sour tracks, team tracks and yard tracks on the Property, 
including the tracks at Pallas Yard, are FRA Class I. 
SIGNAL FACILITIES: 
All of the signal facilities regarding the Property are in good 
working condition. 
GRADE CROSSINGS: 




LEXSEE 2004 UT 80 
Edward George Goebel and Kathy Goebel, Plaintiffs, Appellants, and Cross-
Appellees, v. Salt Lake City Southern Railroad Company, Salt Lake City Corpora-
tion, Inc., Omni Products, Inc., Union Pacific Railroad Company, Utah Transit Dis-
trict, Defendants, Appellees, and Cross-Appellants. 
No. 20020825 
SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
2004 UT 80; 104 P3d 1185; 509 Utah Adv. Rep. 39; 2004 Utah LEXIS 185 
October 1,2004, Filed 
JBSEQUENT HISTORY: [***1J Released for Pub-
ation February 04, 2005 .Rehearing denied by Goebel 
Omni Prods., 2005 Utah LEXIS 19 (Utah, Jan. 20, 
05) 
JOR HISTORY: Third District, Salt Lake. The Hon-
ble Tyrone Medley. 
^POSITION: Affirmed. 
SE SUMMARY: 
3CEDURAL POSTURE: In a premises liability 
, the Third District, Salt Lake (Utah) granted a di-
?d verdict and made other rulings in favor of defen-
railroad, and granted summary judgment for defen-
city. Plaintiff injured bicycle rider and his wife ap-
lA. The railroad cross-appealed. 
^RVIEW: The injured bicycle rider, riding over a 
>ad crossing, crashed, sustaining serious injuries. 
railroad was using the crossing for freight service 
tant to an easement, and the city was responsible for 
taining the street leading up to the crossing. The 
ad had an easement to use the tracks, subject to the 
of an agreement. The trial court correctly granted 
lilroad's motion for directed verdict and correctly 
ssed the injured bicycle rider's negligence claim 
Utah Code Ann. § 56-1-11. As it was unnecessary 
resolution of the issues, the appellate court did not 
;s whether the railroad owed the injured bicycle 
duty of care pursuant to the agreement or whether 
il court abused its discretion in excluding evidence 
Utah R. Evid. 403. The trial court correctly 
I the city's motion for summary judgment on the 
is that the 1998 amendment to Utah Code Ann. § 
63-30-11 (3)(b)(ii), which demanded strict compliance, 
was retroactively applicable. The trial court correctly 
found a "protuberance" in the road was not a proximate 
cause of the accident and the statutory duty did not give 
rise to liability absent notice. 
OUTCOME: The judgment was affirmed. 
LexisNexis(R) Headnotes 
Civil Procedure > Trials > Judgment as Matter of Law 
[HN1] Appellate courts review a trial court's grant of 
directed verdict for correctness. For a directed verdict to 
be appropriate, the evidence must be such that reasonable 
minds could not differ on the facts based on the evidence 
presented at trial. Appellate courts examine the evidence 
in the light most favorable to the losing party, and if that 
evidence and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom 
would support a judgment in favor of the losing party, 
must reverse. If evidence raises a question of material 
fact, it is reversible error for a trial court to grant a mo-
tion for directed verdict. 
Civil Procedure > Jury Trials > Province of Court & 
Jury 
Torts > Causation > Proximate Cause 
Civil Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review > 
Issues of Fact & Law 
[HN2] Proximate cause is an issue of fact and is, there-
fore, not typically resolved by the court in a jury trial. It 
is legal error for a court to grant a directed verdict on the 
issue of causation unless there is no evidence from which 
a reasonable jury might conclude that a breach of a duty 
proximately caused the plaintiffs injury. Put another 
way, if there is any doubt about whether something was a 
Fagez 
2004 UT 80, *, 104 P 3d 1185, **, 
509 Utah Adv Rep 39, 2004 Utah LEXIS 185, *** 
proximate cause of the plaintiff s injuries, the court must 
not decide the issue as a matter of law 
Transportation Law > Rail Transportation > Personal 
Injury & Property Damage 
[HN3] See Utah Code Ann § 10-7-26(2) (2003) 
Transportation Law > Rail Transportation > Mainte-
nance & Safety 
[HN4] See Utah Code Ann § 10-7-29(2003) 
Transportation Law > Rail Transportation > Mainte-
nance & Safety 
[HN5] Utah Code Ann § 56-1-11 (2000) states that 
every railroad company shall be liable for damages 
caused by its neglect to make and maintain good and 
sufficient crossmgs at points where any line of travel 
crosses its road Salt Lake City, Utah, Code § 14 44 030 
requires railway companies to keep portions of streets 
across which then: tracks are constructed and maintained 
m good and safe condition for public travel Salt Lake 
City, Utah, Code § 14 44 030(1987) 
Torts > Real Property Torts > General Premises Liabil-
ity 
[HN6] The mere fact that Utah Code Ann § 56-1-11 
(2000) and Salt Lake City, Utah, Code § 14 44 030 
(1987) do not mention notice does not mean that negli-
gence can be found under them m the absence of notice 
Torts > Negligence > Proof of Negligence > Breach of 
Statute 
[HN7] The omission or commission of somethmg m vio-
lation of a valid statute, or of any ordinance reasonable m 
its terms, is negligence, or evidence of negligence 
Torts > Negligence > Proof of Negligence > Breach of 
Statute 
[HN8] Generally, violations by a railroad of its duty un-
der an ordmance with respect to crossing constitutes, or 
at least gives evidence of, actionable negligence 
Torts > Real Property Torts > General Premises Liabil-
ity 
[HN9] Fault cannot be imputed to a defendant so that 
liability results therefrom unless two conditions are met 
(A) that he had knowledge of the condition, that is, either 
actual knowledge, or constructive knowledge because the 
condition had existed long enough that he should have 
discovered it, and (B) that after such knowledge, suffi-
cient time elapsed that m the exercise of reasonable care 
he should have remedied it 
Torts > Real Property Torts > General Premises Liabil-
ity 
[HN10] Where a defendant in a premises liability case 
either created the condition, or is responsible for it, he is 
deemed to know of the condition, and no further proof of 
notice is necessary 
Torts > Real Property Torts > General Premises Liabil-
ity 
[HN11] In premises liability cases, if a plaintiff alleges 
that a defendant negligently failed to remedy a dangerous 
condition that the defendant did not create, negligently 
failed to repair a dangerous malfunction m an otherwise 
safe system, or negligently allowed an otherwise safe 
condition to degrade over time into a dangerous condi-
tion, then evidence of notice and a reasonable time to 
remedy are required to survive a motion for summary 
judgment or directed verdict These requirements do not 
apply where the negligence claim requires the plaintiff to 
establish that the defendant actually created the danger-
ous condition or purposefully built the dangerous condi-
tion into the system for which the defendant is responsi-
ble The rationale behind these distmct rules is that it is 
reasonable to presume that a party has notice of condi-
tions that the party itself creates, but it is not reasonable 
to presume notice of conditions that someone else cre-
ates, that arise from malfunctions, or that gradually 
evolve on then: own 
Torts > Real Property Torts > Nuisances 
[HN12] See Utah Code Ann § 76-10-803(1995) 
Torts > Real Property Torts > Nuisances 
[HN13] A private party seeking damages for the creation 
of a public nuisance must either show that a defendant's 
action constituted nuisance per se, or demonstrate that 
the defendant's conduct was unreasonable in order to 
impose liability 
Torts > Real Property Torts > Nuisances 
[HN14] Conduct creating a nuisance which harms a 
plaintiff is unreasonable only where it is intentional, neg-
ligent, reckless, or ultrahazardous 
Torts > Real Property Torts > General Premises Liabil-
ity 
[HN15] Failure to repair a defective condition about 
which one neither knows nor reasonably should know is 
neither negligent nor unreasonable That is why notice is 
a requirement 
Civil Procedure > Dismissal of Actions > Involuntary 
Dismissal 
Civil Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review > 
Standards Generally 
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[HN16] Appellate courts review a trial court's decision to 
dismiss a claim for correctness, giving no deference to its 
legal conclusions on the issue. 
Transportation Law > Rail Transportation > Mainte-
tance & Safety 
HN17] Utah Code Ann. § 56-1-11 (2000) provides that 
very railroad company shall be liable for damages 
aused by its neglect to make and maintain good and 
ufficient crossings at points where any line of travel 
rosses its road. 
ivil Procedure > Appeals > Reviewability > Preserva-
on for Review 
INI8] Appellate courts generally do not decide issues 
inecessary to the outcome of the case, and are disin-
ined to issue advisory opinions. 
vil Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review > 
mse of Discretion 
idence > Relevance > Confusion, Prejudice & Waste 
Time 
idence > Procedural Considerations > Rulings on 
idence 
W9] Any litigant seeking to overturn a trial court's 
ision to exclude evidence on the basis of Utah R. 
d. 403 faces a heavy burden: appellate courts review 
ial court's decision to admit or exclude evidence un-
Utah R. Evid. 403 under an abuse of discretion stan-
i, and will not overturn a lower court's determination 
dmissibility unless it is beyond the limits of reason-
ity. 
ernments > Legislation > Effect & Operation > 
pective & Retrospective Operation 
1
 Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review > 
dards Generally 
20] Appellate courts review for correctness ques-
regarding the law applicable in a case, including the 
of whether a given law can or should be applied 
actively. 
rnments > State & Territorial Governments > 
ts By & Against 
1] The Immunity Act demands strict compliance 
ts requirements to allow suit against governmental 
s. The notice of claim provision, particularly, nei-
ontemplates nor allows for anything less. The no-
f claim is to be directed and delivered to the re-
ble governmental entity according to the require-
of Utah Code Ann. § § 63-30-12 or 63-30-13. 
:ode Ann. § 63-30-1 l(3)(b)(ii) (1997). Utah Code 
\ 63-30-13 requires filing of the notice of claim 
be governing body of the political subdivision 
one year of the date on which the claim arose. 
Governments > Legislation > Effect & Operation > 
Prospective & Retrospective Operation 
[HN22] A statute is not to be applied retroactively unless 
the statute expressly declares that it operates retroac-
tively. Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-3 (2000). As a general 
rule, retroactivity is not favored in the law. This rule ap-
plies only with respect to substantive laws, however; 
statutes that do not enlarge, eliminate, or destroy sub-
stantive rights can be applied retroactively. Convenience, 
reasonableness, and justice are factors considered in de-
ciding whether a statute has a merely remedial or proce-
dural purpose. 
Governments > Legislation > Effect & Operation > 
Prospective & Retrospective Operation 
[HN23] When analyzing whether applying a statute as 
amended would have retroactive effects inconsistent with 
the usual rule that legislation is deemed to be prospec-
tive, courts should use a common sense, functional 
judgment about whether the new provision attaches new 
legal consequences to events completed before its en-
actment. This judgment should be informed and guided 
by familiar considerations of fair notice, reasonable reli-
ance, and settled expectations. 
Governments > Legislation > Effect & Operation > 
Prospective & Retrospective Operation 
[HN24] Considering the strong presumptions against 
retroactivity in the law, and the common sense, func-
tional factors that are considered in deciding whether to 
apply a law retroactively, courts should err on the side of 
finding a statute substantive if they have doubt about the 
issue. 
COUNSEL: Peter C. Collins, Salt Lake, for plaintiffs. 
E. Scott Savage, Casey K. McGarvey, Martha S. Stone-
brook, Salt Lake, for defendants. 
JUDGES: DURHAM, Chief Justice. Associate Chief 
Justice Wilkins, Justice Durrant, Justice Parrish, and Jus-
tice Nehring concur in Chief Justice Durham's opinion. 
OPINIONBY: DURHAM 
OPINION: [**1188] DURHAM, Chief Justice: 
INTRODUCTION 
[*P1] Plaintiffs-appellants Edward and Kathy 
Goebel (the Goebels) appeal a grant of directed verdict 
and other rulings in favor of defendant-appellee Salt 
Lake City Southern Railroad Company, Inc. (Southern), 
and a grant of summary judgment in favor of Salt Lake 
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City Corporation (the City). In brief, the Goebels argue 
that the trial court committed reversible error by: 
(1) ruling that, as a matter of law, a cer-
tain roadway obstacle could not have been 
a proximate cause of Mr. Goebel's inju-
ries; 
(2) ruling that the Goebels were required 
to give Southern actual or constructive 
notice of their claim in order to survive 
Southern's motion for a directed verdict, 
despite a duty [***2] imposed upon 
Southern by Utah Code sections 10-7-
26(2), 10-7-29, and 56-1-11, and Salt 
Lake City Code § 14.44.030, and that 
they had failed to adduce evidence from 
which a reasonable jury could find that 
Southern had such notice; 
(3) failing to find that notice could be 
"presumed" in this case based on the al-
leged "permanence" of a dangerous condi-
tion; 
(4) failing to find that evidence of the in-
determinate length of time that the dan-
gerous condition may have existed could 
support a jury finding that Southern had 
constructive notice of the condition; 
(5) finding that notice is required in a 
statute-based public nuisance claim under 
Utah Code section 76-10-803; 
(6) finding that an agreement between 
Union Pacific Railroad Company (Union 
Pacific) and Southern did not impose on 
Southern a duty of care toward Mr. 
Goebel; 
(7) excluding an expert witness's empiri-
cal testing evidence from trial; and 
[**1189] (8) retroactively applying 
amended notice of claim requirements of 
the Governmental Immunity Act with re-
spect to the Goebels* claims against Salt 
Lake City. 
[*P2] Southern cross-appeals, arguing that the trial 
court erred in ruling that Utah Code sections [***3] 10-
7-26, 10-7-29, and 56-1-11, and Salt Lake City Code § 
14.44.030 apply to Southern. 
[*P3] We affirm. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
[*P4] On February 19, 1998, Mr. Goebel was rid-
ing his bicycle on 1700 South Street over a railroad 
crossing near 200 West Street when he crashed, sustain-
ing serious injuries. The Goebels' theory about what 
caused the accident focused partly on the rubber mats, 
called "field panels," that were a component of the cross-
ing. The Goebels therefore brought suit against Omni 
Products, Inc., because its predecessor had manufactured 
the field panels. Additionally, the Goebels sued Union 
Pacific, which had installed the field panels, and Utah 
Transit Authority (UTA), which owned the rail line and 
crossing. The Goebels settled with each of these defen-
dants before trial, and none of them are parties to this 
appeal. The remaining defendants who are parties to this 
appeal are Southern, which was using UTA's crossing for 
freight service pursuant to an easement, and the City, 
which was responsible for maintaining the street leading 
up to the crossing. 
[*P5] The tracks at the crossing had been owned 
by Union Pacific, but Union Pacific sold the tracks to 
[***4] UTA prior to Mr. Goebel's accident. Southern 
was formed in 1992 to continue freight service on the 
tracks, while UTA took on the passenger service. When 
Union Pacific sold the tracks to UTA, it retained a lim-
ited easement for the purpose of freight service, which it 
then immediately transferred to Southern. Southern then 
entered into an Administration and Coordination Agree-
ment (Agreement) with UTA. The Agreement specified 
that Southern could run freight trains on tracks that UTA 
designated as "Freight Trackage." Thus, UTA owned the 
tracks, and Southern had an easement to use the tracks 
for freight purposes, subject to the terms of the Agree-
ment. The Agreement required Southern to maintain 
freight trackage crossings as necessary for freight rail 
service. 
[*P6] At trial, the Goebels attempted to present 
evidence supporting their theory that a "protuberance"--
the Goebels' term—in the road caused Mr. Goebel to steer 
his bicycle into a gap between field panels at the cross-
ing. The field panels raised the level of the roadway al-
most to the level of the rails. The field panels were laid 
next to each other, but over time, the Goebels theorized, 
a gap running parallel to Mr. Goebel's [***5] direction 
of travel grew between two of the field panels. The 
Goebels theorized that Mr. Goebel's accident occurred 
because the front tire of Mr. Goebel's bicycle—a road 
bicycle with relatively narrow wheels and tires—entered 
the gap and jammed against one of the rails. 
[*P7J Notwithstanding the Goebels' theories, how-
ever, no witnesses actually saw, and Mr. Goebel cannot 
actually remember, what caused the accident. Southern 
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presented evidence to support its competing theory of 
what caused Mr. Goebel's accident. According to South-
ern's theory, the gap was not even involved in Mr. 
joebel's accident. 
[*P8J In an order dated July 8, 2002, the trial court 
,ranted the City's motion for summary judgment. The 
ourt granted in part Southern's motion for a directed 
erdict in an order dated August 29, 2002. The court's 
ictual findings and legal conclusions as related to these 
rders are presented as relevant below. 
ANALYSIS 
I. THE DIRECTED VERDICT 
[*P9] The Goebels' first and most significant ar-
ment is that the trial court erred in granting Southern's 
)tion for directed verdict because: (1) there was evi-
nce presented [**1190] at trial from which a jury 
aid conclude [***6] that Southern had constructive 
ice of the protuberance, that it had a duty to fix the 
>tuberance, and that its failure to fix the protuberance 
ximately caused Mr. Goebel to crash; (2) the Goebels 
not need to present evidence that Southern had no-
, because state law imposes an affirmative duty to 
ntain the crossing; (3) pursuant to Schnuphase v. 
-ehouse Markets, 918 P.2d 476 (Utah 1986), South-
should be presumed to have had notice because the 
was a permanent unsafe condition in a crossing for 
:h Southern was responsible; (4) the jury could have 
xed that Southern had constructive notice of the gap 
i evidence that gaps often form gradually over time; 
(5) notice was not required as an element of the 
>els' public nuisance claim. 
[*P10] [HN1] We review a trial court's grant of di-
i verdict for correctness. For a directed verdict to be 
>priate, the evidence must be such that reasonable 
5 could not differ on the facts based on the evidence 
ited at trial. Mgmt. Comm. of Graystone Pines 
owners Ass'n v. Graystone Pines, Inc., 652 P.2d 
W-98 (Utah 1982). We examine the evidence in 
ht [***7] most favorable to the losing party, and if 
ddence and the reasonable inferences drawn there-
ivould support a judgment in favor of the losing 
we must reverse. Id. If evidence raises a "question 
erial fact," it is reversible error for a trial court to 
t motion for directed verdict. See Mahmood v. 
999 UT104, PI6, 990P.2d933. 
The Significance of the Protuberance 
Pll] The Goebels take issue with the trial court's 
that the protuberance was not a proximate cause 
joebel's damages, and further argue that Southern 
h constructive notice of the existence of the pro-
:e and a duty to repair it. The trial court found 
a matter of law, the protuberance is not a proxi-
mate cause of [Mr. Goebel's] injuries . . . . It may very 
well be a factor in this accident, but . . . no dangerous 
gap, no accident. The dangerous gap is the proximate 
cause of the injuries [of] which plaintiff complains." 
[*P12] [HN2] Proximate cause is an issue of fact 
and is, therefore, not typically resolved by the court in a 
jury trial. See Mackay v. 7-Eleven Sales Corp., 2000 UT 
15, PI2, 995 P.2d 1233. [***8] It is legal error for a 
court to grant a directed verdict on the issue of causation 
unless there is no evidence from which a reasonable jury 
might conclude that a breach of a duty proximately 
caused the plaintiffs injury. See Mahmood, 1999 UT 
104 at P2L Put another way, if there is any doubt about 
whether something was a proximate cause of the plain-
tiffs injuries, the court must not decide the issue as a 
matter of law. See Rees v. Albertson's, Inc., 587 P.2d 
130, 133 (Utah 1978). 
[*P13] According to the Goebels* theory of the 
case, it was the gap that actually caused Mr. Goebel to 
fall, and the trial court did find that the gap was the 
proximate cause of the accident. Mr. Goebel argues that 
he steered his front wheel into the gap because he was 
avoiding the protuberance, but this does not mean that 
the existence of the protuberance necessarily forced Mr. 
Goebel to steer into the gap. From the evidence pre-
sented, no reasonable jury could find that the protuber-
ance proximately caused Mr. Goebel to steer into the 
gap. The protuberance was no more a cause of Mr. 
Goebel's accident than his decision to ride his bicycle 
that day, or the weather. [***9] After reviewing the 
evidence, we agree with the trial court and Southern that 
Mr. Goebel could have steered his bicycle into the gap 
regardless of whether the protuberance existed at all. The 
trial court was therefore correct in finding as a matter of 
law that the protuberance was not a proximate cause of 
the accident. 
B. Whether Notice Is Required Where Statutes Im-
pose an Affirmative Duty 
[*P14J Building upon the trial court's ruling that 
Southern is a "railway company" [**1191] that owed 
the Goebels a duty of care pursuant to Utah Code sec-
tions 10-7-26(2), 10-7-29, and 56-1-11, and Salt Lake 
City Code section 14.44.030, the Goebels argue that 
where the duty owed is based upon these statutes, no 
showing of notice is required, and the trial court there-
fore erred in granting the motion for directed verdict for 
failure to prove notice. Southern argues that these stat-
utes do not apply to Southern because it is not a "railway 
company" within the meaning of the statutes, and that 
even if they do apply, they do not require Southern to 
take action without prior notice of the need to do so. 
[*P15] The relevant portion of Utah Code section 
10-7-26(2) provides that [HN3] nothing in this section 
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[***10] or in other sections to which it refers is to be 
construed as exempting 
any railway company from keeping every 
portion of every street and alley used by it 
and upon or across which tracks shall be 
constructed at or near the grade of such 
streets in good and safe condition for pub-
lic travel, but it shall keep the same 
planked, paved, macadamized or other-
wise in such condition for public travel as 
the governing body of the city or town 
may from time to time direct. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-7-26(2) (2003). "Railway com-
pany" is defined as "any company which owns or oper-
ates railway tracks on, along or across a street or alley in 
any city or town." Id. § 10-7-26(1). Utah Code section 
10-7-29 provides, in pertinent part, that 
[HN4] the tracks of all railway companies 
when located upon the streets or avenues 
of a city or town shall be kept in repair 
and safe in all respects for the use of the 
traveling public, and such companies shall 
be liable for all damages resulting by rea-
son of neglect to keep such tracks in re-
pair . . . . For injuries to persons or prop-
erty arising from the failure of any such 
company to keep its tracks in proper re-
pair [***11] . . . such company shall be 
liable and the city or town shall be exempt 
from liability. 
Id. § 10-7-29 (2003). For purposes of this section, a 
"railway company" is defined both as "any company 
which owns or operates railway tracks," id. § 10-7-
26(1), and as any company "owning or operating any . . . 
railway," Id. § 10-7-29. [HN5] Utah Code section 56-1-
11 states that "every railroad company shall be liable for 
damages caused by its neglect to make and maintain 
good and sufficient crossings at points where any line of 
travel crosses its road." Id. § 56-1-11 (2000). Salt Lake 
City Code section 14.44.030 requires "railway compa-
nies" to keep portions of streets "across which their 
tracks . . . are constructed and maintained" in good and 
safe condition for public travel. Salt Lake City, Utah, 
Code§ 14.44.030(1987). 
[*P16] Southern argues that the trial court erred in 
finding Southern owed a statutory duty of care to the 
Goebels because while Southern does operate rolling 
stock upon the railroad tracks, only UTA actually owns 
and operates the railroad tracks. We agree with the 
Goebels and the trial court that these statutes, by their 
[***12] plain language, imposed a duty upon Southern 
to keep the crossing safe for the traveling public. Al-
though Southern's operation of the railroad tracks in 
question is limited to freight service pursuant to the 
easement, and is governed by the Agreement, Southern is 
nonetheless a railroad company operating a "railway" 
within the meaning of the statutes, because it operates 
trains upon the railroad tracks. According to the Agree-
ment, Southern has the "exclusive authority to manage, 
direct and control all railroad and railroad-related opera-
tions on" the tracks designated for freight use, and has 
"exclusive authority to control operations of all trains, 
locomotives, railcars and rail equipment and the move-
ment and speed of the same." As the trial court ex-
plained, the "'operating a railway' language . . . is broad 
enough to encompass Southern's operation, use and utili-
zation of the easement that they had supported by the 
evidence in this particular case." Only different statutory 
language or different factual circumstances could con-
vince us that Southern's regular and longstanding use and 
control of trains on the railway did not amount to opera-
tion of a railway. The trial court therefore [***13) cor-
rectly interpreted the statutes in this regard. 
[**1192] [*P17] While we agree that Southern 
owed a duty to the Goebels, however, that does not mean 
that the statutes obviate the need for the Goebels to show 
notice. The essence of the Goebels' argument on this 
point is simply the observation that the statutes do not 
mention a notice requirement. However, [HN6] the mere 
fact that the statutes do not mention notice does not mean 
that negligence could be found in the absence of notice. 
As the Goebels themselves acknowledge, it is negligence 
law-not strict liability-that provides the foundation for 
liability under these statutes. See Oswald v. Utah Light 
& Ry. Co., 39 Utah 245, 117 P. 46, 47 (Utah 1911) (ex-
plaining in negligence case involving streetcar company 
that[HN7] "the omission or commission of something in 
violation of a valid statute, or of any ordinance reason-
able in its terms, is negligence, or evidence of negli-
gence"); Eugene McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Cor-
porations § 24.721 (3d ed. 2002) [HN8] ("Generally, 
violations by a railroad of its duty under an ordinance 
with respect to crossing constitutes, or at least gives evi-
dence of, actionable negligence."). Because, [***14] as 
we discuss in detail below, notice is a fundamental com-
ponent of the negligence equation in such cases as this 
one, the trial court correctly found that the duty imposed 
by the statutes does not give rise to liability in the ab-
sence of notice. 
C. Whether Notice Can Be Presumed from th< 
"Permanent" Nature of the Gap 
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[*P18] Citing a "long line of cases in Utah" that in-
cludes Schnuphase v. Storehouse Markets, 918 PJd 476 
(Utah 1986), the trial court held that notice was required 
to establish negligence in this case. Furthermore, the 
:ourt found, after evaluating the evidence presented in 
he light most favorable to the Goebels, that the Goebels 
lad presented 
no competent evidence that [1] a danger-
ous gap existed prior to the accident or 
that [2] a dangerous gap existed for a pe-
riod of time sufficient to allow Southern 
to discover it and a sufficient amount of 
time for Southern to remedy it. . . . The 
best . . . the evidence establishes . . . is 
that dangerous gaps develop over time. 
In this court's view, that does not 
constitute competent evidence to allow 
the jury to make a reasonable inference as 
to how long it existed prior to the accident 
[***15J or when it existed prior to the 
accident. If you can't establish duration, 
[and] you can't establish when it existed, 
it appears to me that only through specu-
lation can the jury attempt to reach those 
conclusions in an effort to determine 
whether or not there was sufficient time to 
impart notice and sufficient time to rem-
edy. 
Goebels argue that the gap was "permanent," and 
under Schnuphase, this permanence creates a pre-
tion that Southern knew about the gap. Thus, while 
ial court interpreted Schnuphase as requiring evi-
' of actual or constructive notice, the Goebels inter-
chnuphase as creating a presumption of notice. 
*P19] In Schnuphase, the plaintiff was a business 
5 in a grocery store who slipped and fell on a scoop 
cream dropped by another customer. 918 PJd at 
>iscussing store owners' duty of reasonable care in 
d fall cases, we quoted a previous decision, Allen 
crated Dairy Farms, Inc., 538 PJd 175 (Utah 
identifying two classes of such cases. See 
hase, 918 P.2d at 478. The first class, to which 
hase belonged, was that [***16] involving tem-
unsafe conditions. Id. Cases in this class, we ex-
> require actual or constructive notice for liability 
i: 
It is quite universally held that [HN9] 
fault cannot be imputed to the defendant 
so that liability results therefrom unless 
two conditions are met: (A) that he had 
knowledge of the condition, that is, either 
actual knowledge, or constructive knowl-
edge because the condition had existed 
long enough that he should have discov-
ered it; and (B) that after such knowledge, 
sufficient time elapsed that in the exercise 
of reasonable care he should have reme-
died it. 
(**1193] Id. (quoting Allen, 538 PJd at 176). The 
second class of cases, however, 
involves some unsafe condition of a per-
manent nature, such as: in the structure of 
the building, or of a stairway, etc. or in 
equipment or machinery, or in the manner 
of use, which was created or chosen by 
the defendant (or his agents), or for which 
he is responsible. In such circumstances, 
[HN10] where the defendant either cre-
ated the condition, or is responsible for it, 
he is deemed to know of the condition; 
and no further proof of notice is neces-
sary. 
Id. (quoting Allen, 538 PJd at 176). [***17] While the 
trial court believed this case falls into the first category 
of cases requiring notice, the Goebels argue that the gap 
was an "unsafe condition of a permanent nature," to 
which Southern was "responsible." Therefore, the 
Goebels reason, the instant case falls within the second 
class of cases, requiring no showing of notice. 
[*P20] We conclude, however, that the instant case 
does not fall within the no-notice category of cases that 
we articulated in Allen and Schnuphase because here, the 
defendant did not create the unsafe condition, and is "re-
sponsible" for it only in the context of maintenance, not 
for its existence in the first place. Instead, this case is 
analogous to Fishbaugh v. Utah Power & Light, 969 
PJd 403 (Utah 1998), where we found that a plaintiffs 
failure to present evidence of notice and opportunity to 
remedy was fatal to his case. The plaintiff in Fishbaugh 
had been crossing a street at night when he was hit by a 
car. Id. None of the streetlights were functioning. Con-
sequently, in addition to suing the driver of the car, the 
plaintiff sued the power company for negligently failing 
to maintain or [***18J operate the streetlights. Id. The 
plaintiff also sued the city, claiming that the street was in 
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a dangerous condition, and that the city had negligently 
failed to repair the lights even though it knew about the 
lighting problem before the accident. Id. The city and the 
power company both moved for summary judgment, 
based partly on their argument that they "had no notice 
of the outage prior to the accident and thus could not be 
held negligent" Id. A key issue on appeal was whether 
the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the 
defendants on the ground that there was no evidence of 
either actual or constructive notice and, therefore, no 
negligence. Id. at 405. We expressly applied the rule we 
articulated in Schnuphase, requiring evidence of both 
notice and sufficient time in which to remedy the dan-
gerous condition. Id. at 407. As a result, we affirmed the 
grant of summary judgment, reasoning that even if there 
was evidence that the defendants had notice of the dan-
gerous condition of the streetlights at some indeterminate 
time before the accident, "there is no evidence indicating 
how long UP&L had such notice. Without any [***19] 
evidence to that effect, Fishbaugh cannot prove that the 
City and UP&L failed to repair the streetlights within a 
reasonable time after receiving notice and that they were 
thus negligent in maintaining the streetlights." Id. at 408 
(emphasis added). 
[*P21] As in Fishbaugh, the proximate cause of 
Mr. Goebel's injury was the breakdown or mechanical 
degradation of something that was not alleged to have 
been negligently created or installed. As in Fishbaugh, 
therefore, this case falls into the category of negligence 
cases requiring evidence that the defendant had some 
kind of notice of the dangerous condition, together with 
evidence that the defendant had that notice for a time 
sufficient for it to repair the condition. In Fishbaugh, 
there was evidence that the defendants may have indeed 
had notice, but evidence was lacking regarding the length 
of time that they had such notice. Id. In the instant case, 
however, there is no evidence of notice, let alone evi-
dence of how long Southern may have had that notice. 
(*P22] [HN11] If a plaintiff alleges that a defen-
dant negligently failed to remedy a dangerous condition 
that the defendant did not create (as [***20] in 
Schnuphase), negligently failed to repair a dangerous 
malfunction in an otherwise safe system (as in 
Fishbaugh), or negligently allowed an otherwise safe 
condition to degrade over time into a dangerous 
[**1194] condition (as in the instant case), then evi-
dence of notice and a reasonable time to remedy are re-
quired to survive a motion for summary judgment or 
directed verdict. These requirements do not apply where 
the negligence claim requires the plaintiff to establish 
that the defendant actually created the dangerous condi-
tion or purposefully built the dangerous condition into 
the system for which the defendant is responsible. The 
rationale behind these distinct rules is that it is reason-
able to presume that a party has notice of conditions that 
the party itself creates, but it is not reasonable to presume 
notice of conditions that someone else creates (as in 
Schnuphase), that arise from malfunctions (as in 
Fishbaugh), or that gradually evolve on their own. 
[*P23] The Goebels tried to establish constructive 
notice by arguing that Southern only lacked actual notice 
of the gap because it failed to perform reasonable inspec-
tions of the crossing. The evidence at trial showed, 
[***21] however, not only that the crossing was regu-
larly inspected, but also that Mr. Goebel and Mr. 
Goebel's bicycling expert, Charles Collins, both of whom 
had used the crossing numerous times before the acci-
dent and should thus have been highly attuned to poten-
tial bicycle safety issues in the crossing, failed to notice 
the gap. In that regard, this case is comparable to Ma-
loney v. Salt Lake City, I Utah 2d 72, 262 P.2d 281 
(Utah 1953). In Maloney, the plaintiff alleged that Salt 
Lake City had negligently maintained a sidewalk that 
collapsed while he was on it. Id. at 282. We affirmed a 
directed verdict in favor of the city, emphasizing that the 
plaintiff was unable to show that the sidewalk was in a 
defective condition before the collapse, even though the 
plaintiff himself had used the sidewalk many times prior 
to the accident. Id. In this case, the Goebels failed as a 
matter of law to establish constructive notice because 
reasonable minds could not differ regarding whether 
Southern should have noticed the gap. The trial court 
therefore rightly found that no reasonable jury could 
have found that Southern had constructive notice based 
on the failure to reasonably [***22J inspect. 
D. Whether the Length of Time the Gap Could Have 
Existed Created Constructive Notice 
[*P24] The Goebels also argue that the gap must 
have evolved gradually over time, and that Southern 
would therefore have noticed it if Southern had been 
paying proper attention. Therefore, the Goebels assert, 
the jury could have found that Southern should have 
known it existed long enough to have a reasonable time 
in which to repair it. The Goebels cite no case law to 
support this proposition, aside from one case that states 
generally that jurors can "make justifiable inferences 
from circumstantial evidence to find negligence." Lind-
say v. Gibbons & Reed, 27 Utah 2d 419, 497 P.2d 28, 31 
(Utah 1972). 
[*P25] First, contrary to the Goebels' assertions, 
the evidence presented did not incontrovertibly prove 
that the gap must have evolved gradually over time. In 
fact, there was evidence that the gap may have formed 
suddenly by being scraped or struck by, for example, a 
snow plow. More importantly, however, even if the gap 
had existed for a very long time, there is no reason to 
believe that Southern should have noticed it. As we have 
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already explained, there was no [***23J evidence from 
which a reasonable jury could conclude that Southern 
Failed to reasonably inspect the crossing. See supra Part 
.C. Moreover, even if Southern had notice of the gap for 
ome time prior to the accident, the Goebels have offered 
bsolutely no evidence from which a jury could infer the 
?ngth of time that Southern had such notice. Therefore, 
ot only would the jury have to speculate about whether 
outhern had notice of the dangerous gap in the first 
lace, it would also have to speculate about whether 
Duthern had that notice far enough in advance to repair 
e gap before Mr. Goebel's accident. Given our explicit 
ling in Fishbaugh that a plaintiff in this kind of case 
jst present evidence of the length of time that the de-
ldant had notice, the Goebels' mere hypothesis that the 
3 may have existed for some unknown length of time 
ss not suffice. 
E. Whether Notice Is Required Under the Goebels' 
)lic Nuisance Claim 
[*P26] The Goebels' final argument for why the 
1
 court erred in granting [**1195] Southern's motion 
a directed verdict is that proof of notice was not re-
ed for their public nuisance claim, which was based 
Jtah Code section 76-10-803. The [***24] version 
xtion 76-10-803 in effect in 1998, when the accident 
rred, read in pertinent part as follows: 
[HN12] (1) A public nuisance is a crime 
against the order and economy of the state 
and consists in unlawfully doing any act 
or omitting to perform any duty, which 
act or omission* 
(a) annoys, injures, or en-
dangers the comfort, re-
pose, health, or safety of 
three or more persons; 
(c) unlawfully interferes 
with, obstructs, or tends to 
obstruct, or renders dan-
gerous for passage, any . . . 
street or highway; [or] 
(e) in any way renders 
three or more persons inse-
cure in life or the use of 
property. 
(2) An act which affects three or more 
persons in any of the ways specified in 
this section is still a nuisance regardless of 
the extent [to which the] annoyance or 
damage inflicted on individuals is un-
equal. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-803 (1995). In a lengthy and 
detailed analysis of this statute, the court of appeals has 
interpreted section 76-10-803 to mean that a plaintiff 
"must demonstrate that defendant's conduct was unrea-
sonable in order to recover." Erickson v. Sorensen, 877 
P.2d 144, 147-49 (Utah Ct App. 1994) [***25] (inter-
preting the 1990 version of Utah Code section 76-10-
803). [HN13] "[A] private party seeking damages for the 
creation of a public nuisance must. . . [either] show that 
defendant's action constituted nuisance per se, [or] dem-
onstrate that the defendant's conduct was unreasonable in 
order to impose liability." Id. at 148-49 (citing Branch 
v. W. Petroleum, Inc., 657 R2d 267, 276 (Utah 1982); 
Turnbaugh v. Anderson, 793 P.2d 939, 943 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990)). The Goebels did not attempt to assert negli-
gence per se. Instead, they focused on proving that 
Southern acted unreasonably. The Erickson court also 
properly explained what constitutes "unreasonable" be-
havior: [HN14] "Conduct creating a nuisance which 
harms the plaintiff is unreasonable only where it is inten-
tional, negligent, reckless, or ultrahazardous." Id. at 149. 
The parties agree that Southern's act of allowing the gap 
to exist was neither intentional, nor reckless, nor ultra-
hazardous. Consequently, in order to survive Southern's 
motion for directed verdict on the public nuisance claim, 
the Goebels had to present evidence from which a rea-
sonable jury could find that Southern's [***26] conduct 
was negligent. 
[*P27] The Goebels argue that because the court in 
Erickson did not discuss whether notice is required to 
prove unreasonableness, notice is not required. We dis-
agree for two reasons. First, there is no reason to believe 
that notice was at issue in Erickson. In Erickson, the 
plaintiff bicyclist collided with a sign defendant had 
placed on the side of the road a few hours previously. Id. 
at 146. There is no reason to believe that notice would 
have been an issue on appeal in Erickson because outside 
of a few conceivable but highly improbable circum-
stances, a party will always have notice of its own ac-
tions. In contrast here, Mr. Goebel's accident was caused 
by a gap that either grew on its own or was created by a 
third party, such as a snow plow driver. Second, we be-
lieve that [HN15] failure to repair a defective condition 
about which one neither knows nor reasonably should 
know is neither negligent nor unreasonable. That is why 
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notice is a requirement in negligence cases such as this 
one See supra Part I C (discussing Schnuphase, 918 
P 2d at 476, and Fishbaugh, 969 P 2d at 407) 
[*P28] Thus, we find [***27] that the trial court 
committed no error m granting Southern's motion for 
directed verdict 
II DISMISSAL OF THE GOEBELS' SECTION 56-
1-11 NEGLIGENCE CLAIM 
[*P29] The Goebels' second argument is that the 
trial court erred in ruling that the [**1196] Goebels 
could not pursue a claim against Southern based on Utah 
Code section 56-1-11 because such a claim would be 
superfluous to the Goebels' common law negligence 
claim [HN16] We review a trial court's decision to dis-
miss a claim for correctness, givmg no deference to its 
legal conclusions on the issue Rushton v Salt Lake 
County, 1999 UT36, PI 7, 977 P 2d 1201 
[*P30] [HN17] Section 56-1-11 of the Utah Code 
provides, "Every railroad company shall be liable for 
damages caused by its neglect to make and maintain 
good and sufficient crossings at points where any lme of 
travel crosses its road" Utah Code Ann § 56-1-11 
(2000) The Goebels assert that section 56-1-1 Ts use of 
the word "neglect" refers to a kind of wrongdoing differ-
ent from "negligence," and that therefore a claim pursued 
under section 56-1-11 does not require a showing that 
Southern had actual or constructive notice of the danger-
ous condition [***28] If we found this argument con-
vincing, it would mean that a claim under section 56-1-
11 was not superfluous to the Goebels' common law neg-
ligence claim 
[*P31] Although the Goebels cite case law m 
which notice was not at issue, see Van Wagoner v Un-
ion Pac RR Co, 112 Utah 189, 186 P2d 293 (Utah 
1947), and deduce therefrom that notice is not required, 
they cite no affirmative pronouncements for this point 
As explamed above in Part IB , notice is required for a 
claim based on section 56-1-11 to survive The clear rule 
from Allen, Schnuphase, and Fishbaugh is that notice is 
required to prove negligence in the context of a case such 
as this one We find no reason to believe that the legisla-
ture used the word "neglect" in section 56-1-11 as a sort 
of code word for "negligence liability m the absence of 
notice " If the legislature saw fit to uproot the thoroughly 
entrenched notion of notice from the law of negligence m 
cases like this, we believe it could and would do so more 
explicitly and less ambiguously than by simply usmg the 
word "neglect" The tnal court therefore was correct m 
dismissing the Goebels' section 56-1-11 claim for negli-
gence [***29J 
III A DUTY BASED ON THE AGREEMENT 
[*P32] The Goebels' third argument is that the tnal 
court ereed m finding that the Agreement was clear and 
unambiguous and did not create a duty of care running 
from Southern to the Goebels Alternatively, the Goebels 
argue, the Agreement is ambiguous on the question of 
whether it creates the Goebels' desired duty of care and, 
therefore, the Goebels should be permitted to introduce 
extrinsic evidence on this point 
[*P33] Even if we were to find that the Agreement 
created a duty that ran from Southern to the Goebels, and 
that the trial court therefore ened in ruling to the con-
trary, such an ereor would not warrant reversal This is 
because we affirm the trial court's finding that Southern 
had a duty to the Goebels pursuant to Utah Code sections 
10-7-26(2), 10-7-29, and 56-1-11, and Salt Lake City 
Code section 14 44 030 See supra Part I B The Goebels 
expressly acknowledge this point, but ask us to address 
the question for purposes of the new trial that the 
Goebels request us to grant in this case Because we af-
firm, however, no new trial will be held, and it is there-
fore unnecessary for us to reach the question of whether 
the [***30] Agreement gave nse to a duty running from 
Southern to the Goebels [HN18] We generally do not 
decide issues unnecessary to the outcome of the case, see 
Provo City Corp v Thompson, 2004 UT 14, P22, 86 
P 3d 735 (finding the court of appeals' discussion of an 
issue to be merely advisory m nature where the court of 
appeals' conclusion on the issue "lacked any mean-
ingful effect to the parties"), and we are disinclined to 
issue advisory opinions, Miller v Weaver, 2003 UT 12, 
P26,66P3d592 
IV EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE 
[*P34J The Goebels' fourth argument is that the 
tnal court erred m excludmg, on the basis of rule 403 of 
the Utah Rules of Evidence, the empincal evidence of 
their expert witness, David Ingebretsen Accordmg to 
[**1197] the Goebels, the evidence would have lent 
strength to Mr Ingebretsen's opinion, which was allowed 
into evidence, that Mr Goebel's accident occuned when 
his front wheel entered the gap Specifically, the evi-
dence consisted of the results of a test that Mr Ingebret-
sen performed to confirm that Mr Goebel's tire could fit 
mto a gap like the one at the subject crossing 
[*P35] Even if we were to conclude that the 
[***31] tnal court did en m excluding the evidence, oui 
decision on the issue would be of no consequence to thi< 
litigation in light of our other holdmgs That is because 
the implicit reason for the Goebels' appeal on this issue l 
that the evidence should have been admitted because i 
would have assisted the tner of fact in evaluating th 
Goebels' case Because we affirm the tnal court's dec 
sion to grant the directed verdict and remove the cas 
from the jury's consideration, it is unnecessary for us i 
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decide this issue nl See Thompson, 2004 UT 14 atP22, 
Miller, 2003 UT12 at P26 
nl [HN19] Any litigant seeking to overturn 
the trial court's decision to exclude evidence on 
the basis of rule 403 faces a heavy burden "We 
review a trial court's decision to admit or exclude 
evidence under Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence under an abuse of discretion standard, 
and will not overturn a lower court's determina-
tion of admissibility unless it is beyond the limits 
of reasonabihty " Diversified Holdings, L C v 
Turner, 2002 UT 129, P6, 63 P 3d 686 (internal 
quotation omitted) Our review of the record and 
the trial court's reasoning m this case strongly 
suggests that the Goebels' arguments would not 
have been able to shoulder this burden 
**32] 
V RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF NOTICE 
CLAIM REQUIREMENTS 
[*P36] The Goebels' fifth and final claim on appeal 
lat the trial court erroneously granted Salt Lake City's 
ion for summary judgment because the Goebels 
plied with the notice of claim requirements in the 
ernmental Immunity Act in effect on the date of Mr 
bel's injury [HN20] We review for correctness ques-
regardmg the law applicable m a case, including the 
of whether a given law can or should be applied 
actively Evans & Sutherland Computer Corp v 
State Tax Comm'n, 953 P 2d 435, 437 (Utah 1997), 
n & Root Indus Serv v Indus Comm'n, 947 P2d 
575 (Utah 1997) 
*P37] [HN21] "The Immunity Act demands strict 
liance with its requirements to allow suit against 
lmental entities The notice of claim provision, 
llarly, neither contemplates nor allows for anything 
Wheeler v McPherson, 2002 UT 16, PI 3, 40 P 3d 
AT Goebel's accident occurred on February 19, 
it which time the Utah Code required the notice of 
to be "directed and delivered to the responsible 
mental entity accordmg to the [***33] require-
)f§ 63-30-12 or § 63-30-13 " Utah Code Ann § 
l(3)(b)(n) (1997) (emphasis added) Section 63-
the other statutory provision pertinent to this is-
uired filing of the notice of claim with "the gov-
>ody of the political subdivision" withm one year 
late on which the claim arose Id § 63-30-13 
is added) Thus, the Goebels argue that they 
and timely filed their notice of claim, because 
d it with DeeDee Corradini, the mayor of Salt 
y at the time of filing, and also with the "Salt 
Lake City Council and All Members of the Salt Lake 
City Council" withm one year of the accident 
[*P38] The Goebels recognize that the notice re-
quirement m effect on August 11, 1998, when they actu-
ally filed their notice, was different from that which was 
m effect at the time of Mr Goebel's injury, due to a 
statutory amendment effective May 4, 1998 The notice 
provision m effect on August 11, 1998 required the no-
tice of claim to be directed and delivered to "the city or 
town recorder, when the claim is against an incorporated 
city or town" Id § 63-30-1 l(3)(b)(n)(A) (Supp 
j***34j 2003) (emphasis added) They argue, however, 
that the amended notice provision was inapplicable to 
their claim because applying it to them would constitute 
improper retroactive application of the law 
[*P39] [HN22] A statute is not to be applied retro-
actively unless the statute expressly declares [**1198] 
that it operates retroactively Id § 68-3-3 (2000), 
Stephens v Henderson, 741 P 2d 952, 953-54 (Utah 
1987) We agree with the Umted States Supreme Court 
that as a general rule, "retroactivity is not favored m the 
law" Bowen v Georgetown Umv Hosp, 488 US 204, 
208, 102 L Ed 2d 493, 109 S Ct 468 (1988) This rule 
applies only with respect to substantive laws, however, 
statutes that do not "enlarge, eliminate, or destroy" sub-
stantive rights can be applied retroactively Moore v 
Am Coal Co, 737 P 2d 989, 990 (Utah 1987) (internal 
quotation omitted), quoted in Thomas v Color Country 
Mgmt, 2004 UT 12, P30, 84 P 3d 1201 (Durham, C J , 
concurring) Convenience, reasonableness, and justice 
are factors we consider in decidmg whether a statute has 
a merely remedial or procedural purpose Docutel Oli-
vetti Corp v Dick Brady Sys, 731 P 2d 475, 478 (Utah 
1986) [***35] (quotmg Boucofski v Jacobsen, 36 Utah 
165, 104 P 117, 119-20 (Utah 1909)), see also Moore, 
737 P 2d at 990 (statmg that convenience and reason-
ableness are factors to be considered) 
[HN23] When analyzing whether apply-
ing a statute as amended "would have ret-
roactive effects inconsistent with the usual 
rule that legislation is deemed to be pro-
spective," we should use "a common 
sense, functional judgment about 'whether 
the new provision attaches new legal con-
sequences to events completed before its 
enactment' This judgment should be in-
formed and guided by 'familiar considera-
tions of farr notice, reasonable reliance, 
and settled expectations"' Martin v 
Hadix, 527 US 343, 357-58, 144 L Ed 
2d 347, 119 S Ct 1998 (1999) (quoting 
Landgraf v USI Film Prods, 511 US 
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244, 270, 128 L. Ed. 2d 229, 114 S. Ct 
1483 (1994)). 
Thomas, 2004 UT 12 atP35 (Durham, C.J., concurring). 
[HN24] Considering the strong presumptions against 
retroactivity in the law, and the common sense, func-
tional factors that we consider in deciding whether to 
apply a law retroactively, we should err on the side of 
finding a [***36] statute substantive if we have doubt 
about the issue. 
[*P40] We have no doubt that the change in the no-
tice of claim provision at issue in this case is procedural 
in nature, and therefore retroactively applicable. The 
amendment did nothing to affect the Goebels' substantive 
rights to bring suit against the City. It merely changed 
the identity of the party receiving the notice of claim 
from the City's "governing body" to the city recorder. It 
would be difficult to conceive of a statutory change that 
would do less to "enlarge, eliminate, or destroy" a plain-
tiffs substantive rights. The trial court therefore properly 
granted summary judgment to the City. 
CONCLUSION 
[*P41J The trial court correctly granted Southern's 
motion for directed verdict and correctly dismissed the 
Goebels' negligence claim under section 56-1-11 of the 
Utah Code. As it was unnecessary to our resolution of 
the issues, we have not addressed whether Southern 
owed the Goebels a duty of care pursuant to the Agree-
ment or whether the trial court abused its discretion in 
excluding evidence under rule 403 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence. Finally, the trial court correctly granted the 
City's motion for summary [***37] judgment on the 
grounds that the 1998 amendment to Utah Code section 
63-30-1 l(3)(b)(ii), which demands strict compliance, is 
retroactively applicable. 
[*P42] Associate Chief Justice Wilkins, Justice 
Durrant, Justice Parrish, and Justice Nehring concur in 
Chief Justice Durham's opinion. 
